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This thesis focuses on the grant and promotion of transparency within the South Afri-
can legal system and the constitutionality of the Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 
(‘PAIA’). It draws upon the constitutional background regarding the constitutions of 
1993 and 1996 and examines the PAIA against it. 
To be able to access information is crucial in many ways. It is a prerequisite to gain 
knowledge which can be defined as a systematically organized amount of information. 
Information extends the choices of action; furthermore, it constitutes an important fac-
tor in an economy. Within our globalised and IT-interlinked world information is as 
important as time or money. Nowadays, no one can afford to make uninformed choices 
in our often so called ‘information society’.1 The authority to distribute information 
forms a considerable factor of economic power. Whoever shares information also 
shares power. The possible area of conflicts is huge: Due to modern technology, infor-
mation can be replicated without high costs and without loss of quality. It can be easily 
transmitted over vast distances within seconds via fax and email and also be made avail-
able to an unlimited number of people via websites. The share of information generally 
is irrevocable – once proliferated, information is hard to control. Furthermore, to ac-
quire proper information necessarily precedes any legal action. 
Within a democracy, the state gathers and stores information on behalf of its citi-
zenry. Still there is considerable resistance by public bodies to granting wide access to 
held information. The perception is, that information access requirements are a drag to 
‘core’ agency functions, that an agency might be embarrassed, that disclosure might 
jeopardise agency enforcement functions or constitute an unwanted intrusion into pri-
vate interests or just the sense that the devoted effort merely serves individual curiosity 
or commercial interests.2 For this and other reasons it often seems to be common sense 
to keep as much information confidential as possible - contradictory to the constitu-
tional goal of a transparent society. 
The main concern of this thesis is that information is very time-sensitive. The prin-
cipal argument is that late access to information often proves worthless. This makes the 
                                                 
1  See Bovens, Mark ‘Information Rights: Citizenship in the Information Society’ (2002) 10 Journal 
of Political Philosophy 317 at 327. 
2  Grunewald, Mark H ‘E-FOIA and the “Mother of all Complaints:” Information Delivery and 
Delay Reduction’ (1998) 50 Administrative Law Review 345 at 367; Sinrod, Eric J ‘Freedom of In-
formation Act Response Deadlines: Bridging the Gap between Legislative Intend and Economic 
Reality’ (1993-1994) 43 American University Law Review 325 at 342. 
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right of access to information very vulnerable to procedural issues. The thesis will exam-
ine the procedural flaws that lead to the unconstitutionality of PAIA and which have to 
be resolved for the sake of an effective and efficient implementation of access to infor-
mation as stipulated by the constitution. 
To define ‘transparency’ is difficult. One reason is that the term is used in almost 
every context these days.3 For instance, it is easier to describe the contrary of ‘transpar-
ency’, by using terms like ‘opacity’, ‘ambiguity’, ‘uncertainty’ or ‘vagueness’, just to name 
some besides the negation ‘intransparency’. In the legal and political context underlying 
this paper, transparency is best characterised as a general issue of ‘public hygiene’.4 ‘Access 
to information’ as a subset of the general term ‘transparency’ is more concrete. While 
‘transparency’ appears to constitute an ‘overall value’, access to information is an indi-
vidual right, regarded as part of the ‘fourth wave of citizens’ rights’.5  
Other important terms include ‘privacy’ and ‘secrecy’ as they are often used to jus-
tify the limitations of the right of access to information. While privacy and secrecy can 
be defined as ‘control over one’s […] information’,6 ‘transparency’ and ‘access to infor-
mation’ are about control over information other people hold. 
                                                 
3  The search for ‘transparency’ via Google results in not less than 40.7 billion web hits, the search 
for ‘access to information’ still in 1.1 billion web hits.  
4  See eg Bovens (note 1) at 317 ff. 
5  Bovens (note 1) at 327. 
6  For different definitional approaches to privacy and critics see O’Brien, David M ‘Privacy and 
the Right of Access: Purposes and Paradoxes of Information Control’ (1978) 30 Administrative 
Law 45 at 63 ff. 
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B. The Constitutional Framework of Transparency  
To bolster transparency between the state and individuals is quite a young concept even 
in many mature democracies.7 Formerly, the arcane-principle has dominated public au-
thorities’ behaviour: Information held by the state was in principle considered confiden-
tial and individuals usually had to prove a sufficient interest to gain access to informa-
tion.8 Moving away from that concept, many countries recently9 shifted from a ‘need to 
know’-basis to a ‘right to know’-basis.10  
This chapter will show that the concept of transparency is deeply entrenched in the 
young South African democracy considering the Interim Constitution of 199311 and the 
1996 Constitution. Both Constitutions contain a right of access to information as part of 
the Bill of Rights and include various provisions with the purpose to enforce transpar-
ency. PAIA must be tested against that constitutional background to determine whether 
the constitutional right of access to information has been ‘given effect’ properly by the 
legislation. 
I. The Interim Constitution 
Shaken by the experiences of iron-tight secrecy during Apartheid,12 South Africa de-
cided to make the society transparent in large leaps.13 It was believed that this change 
                                                 
7  Ackermann, JM/Sandoval-Ballesteros, IE ‘The Global Explosion of Freedom of Information 
Laws’ (2006) 58 Administrative Law Review 85 at 85 f registered an incline in specific access to in-
formation laws from 10 nations worldwide in 1985 to 66 nations in 2005. Also see Mendel, Toby 
‘Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Survey’ (2003), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/filedownload.php [accessed 3 July 2007] at iii ff. 
8  The administrative practise in the United States of America until the enactment of the United 
States FOIA in 1966 may serve as an example; see O’Brien (note 6) at 59 f. An exception can be 
found in the Scandinavian countries which look upon a long tradition of openness; Sweden en-
acted its freedom of information-act (‘Tryckfrihetsförordningen”) in 1766, 13 years before the 
French revolution, Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 88.  
9  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 97 ff provide a table of all nations with freedom of 
information-laws. It is a rapid development as two thirds of those laws have been enacted during 
the last five years. Also see Balisar, David ‘The Freedominfo.org Global Survey: Freedom of In-
formation and Access to Government Record Laws around the World’ (2004), available at 
http://www.freedominfo.org [accessed 6.7.2007] at 2 ff; Mendel (note 7) at 16 ff. 
10  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 93. 
11  Act 2 of 1994, herein forth ‘Interim Constitution’. 
12  See the preamble of PAIA. Also see Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 112; Currie, 
Ian/Klaaren, Jonathan ‘An update on Access to Information in South Africa: New directions in 
transparency’ in (2003) 107 Freedom of Information Review 72 at 73; McKinley, Dale T ‘The State of 
Access to Information in South Africa’ (2005), available at http://www.csvr.org.za [accessed 21 Au-
gust 2007] at 1 f; Mendel (note 7) at 69. 
13  Merely regard the significant shift from the ‘Protection of Information Act 84 of 1982’ to the 
‘Promotion of Access to Information Act of 2000’. During Apartheid there was a plethora of 
provisions prohibiting the disclosure of information without permission and rendering such a 
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could only be achieved by emphasising ‘the notions of “accountability, responsiveness 
and openness” at all levels of government’.14 The new government itself almost imme-
diately recognised open debate and transparency as ‘crucial elements’.15 The 1993 In-
terim Constitution recognized openness as a core value to a democratic society.16 Nego-
tiators of the Interim Constitution encompassed two measurements in the constitutional 
text to make sure the ‘almost claustrophobic culture of secrecy’ would be overcome in 
the new South Africa. Section 23 granted access to information, and Constitutional 
Principle IX made sure that an equal right would find its way into the ‘final’ Constitu-
tion.17
The central provision to the core value of transparency is the Interim Constitution’s 
right to access to information. The provision grants access to information as a common 
right rather than a privilege, which constituted a dramatic reversal from the former state 
of secrecy.18 The right of access to information as envisaged by the Interim Constitution 
was restricted to information held by the state. Furthermore, requesters had to show 
that they need the information for the protection or exercise of another right. 
Other provisions of the 1993 Constitution are also linked to transparency. For ac-
cused people the Interim Constitution established a lex specialis to the general right to access 
to information: Section 25 (3) (b) grants everybody the right to be informed with suffi-
cient particularity of the charge. Section 24 granted everybody the right to administrative 
justice. This included the right to procedural fairness19 and the right to be given reasons 
in writing20 which must be capable of justifying the administrative action.21 Section 24 
therefore envisaged an overall fair and comprehensible administrative process. Further-
more, the Interim Constitution ordered public access to the national Parliament22 as well 
                                                                                                                                          
crime to be punished with imprisonment, see Corder, Hugh ‘Administrative Justice: A Corner-
stone of South Africa’s Democracy’ in (1998) 14 South African Journal of Human Rights 38 at 43. 
For the history of the act also see Currie, Ian/Klaaren, Jonathan ‘The Promotion of Access to Informa-
tion Act Commentary’, Claremont (2002) at 1.1 ff. 
14  Corder (note 13) at 43. 
15  African National Congress ‘The Reconstruction and Development Programme: A Policy 
Framework’ (1994) at § 5.14.1. 
16  Section 35 (1) of the Interim Constitution, see Johannessen, Lene/Klaaren, Jonathan/White, 
Justin ‘A Motivation for Legislation on Access to Information’ (1995) 112 South African Law Jour-
nal 45 at 45. 
17  Currie/Klaaren (note 12) at 73. 
18  Currie/Klaaren (note 12) at 73. 
19  Section 24 (b) of the Interim Constitution. 
20  Section 24 (c) of the Interim Constitution. 
21  Section 24 (d) of the Interim Constitution. 
22  Section 67 of the Interim Constitution. 
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as to provincial legislatures.23 Section 13 of the Interim Constitution grants everybody 
the right to privacy and therefore is capable of justifying limitations regarding the right of 
access to information. Schedule four of the Interim Constitution provides 34 principles 
that the final Constitution of 1996 had to comply with. When certifying the final Consti-
tution, the Constitutional Court stated that it is a general and ‘implicit requirement of 
the [Constitutional Principles]’ to have an ‘open and accountable administration’.24 The 
principles also explicitly demanded transparency: Principle II states that the given rights, 
freedoms and civil liberties shall be protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in 
the Constitution, a goal that naturally requires transparency. Furthermore, Principle VI 
discusses separation of powers as well as checks and balances which are meant to secure 
openness. The Principles VI and IX have been especially vital for installing participatory 
democracy.25 The central principle regarding transparency is Principle IX which made 
clear that the drafters of the Constitution wanted the right of access to information am-
plified and extended in the final Constitution.26
II. The Final Constitution 
Transparency has been deeply entrenched in the final constitution of 1996 which is 
demonstrated by the extended right of access to information as well as by various other 
provisions. 
The central column of the Constitution’s system of transparency is the right of ac-
cess to information as granted by s 32. The wording of the provision is defined, yet 
there are three textual indications that it has to be interpreted widely. First, ‘any informa-
tion’ indicates that there generally is no such information which can be withheld solely 
due to its character or content. Second, the group of subjects of the right (‘the state’, ‘an-
other person’) as well as the group of claimants (‘everyone’) is interpreted very broadly. 
The term ‘the state’ is not defined in the Constitution itself, but it surely must be inter-
preted broader than the term ‘organs of state’ which is defined in s 239.27 Due to the 
                                                 
23  Section 142 of the Interim Constitution. 
24  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at 
para 285. 
25  Corder (note 13) at 42. 
26  White, Justin ‘Open Democracy: Has the Window of Opportunity Closed?’ in (1998) 14 South 
African Journal of Human Rights 65 at 67 f. 
27  Baxter, LG ‘The State and other Basic Terms in Public Law’ (1982) 99 South African Law Journal 
212 at 220 ff. defines ‘the state’ as a conglomeration of organs, instruments, and institutions that 
have as their common purpose the management of the public affairs and the public interest of 
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fact that ‘everyone’ and not merely ‘every citizen’ is entitled to information held by the 
state, the interpretation of s 32 is that the state holds information not only on behalf of 
its citizenry but on behalf of ‘everyone’ within its borders. Third, the claimant only has 
to prove a specific interest - the need of the information for the exercise or protection 
of any right - to receive information from a person other than the state.28 Information 
held by the state and its organs therefore underlies a constitutional presumption that it 
must be granted to requesters on a simple request and without a ‘need to know’.  
It is important to note, that s 32 significantly differs from its predecessor, s 23 of 
the Interim Constitution.29 The latter did not envisage the gain of privately held infor-
mation and as a result did not state the different requirements depending on the nature 
of the requested body. Furthermore, s 23 stipulated higher obstacles for access to publicly 
held information, as requesters always had to indicate a ‘need to know’, a condition that 
now is only needed for access to privately held information. 
The significance of the right of access to information is stressed by the constitu-
tional limits contained in s 32 (2) which appear narrow when compared to the wide ap-
plication scope set out in subsection (1). Subsection (2) obliges the state to enact na-
tional legislation to ‘give effect’ to the right of access to information and allows for 
reasonable measures to alleviate the administrative and financial burdens associated with 
accessing information. The wording ‘must be enacted to give effect to this right’30 does 
not intend to regard s 32 as a ‘nascent, or almost-right’. Rather it demands that the na-
tional legislation must provide procedures, statutory mechanisms, tribunals’ and any 
other measures to easily and more effectively implement those rights.31 Such legislation 
had to be enacted within three years; otherwise, the subsection would have lapsed.32 The 
                                                                                                                                          
the residents of South Africa as well as those of the citizens of abroad, in their relations with the 
South African government. 
28  Section 32 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
29  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 1.3 f. 
30  Section 32 (2) of the Constitution. 
31  Corder, Hugh ‘Administrative Justice in the Final Constitution’ (1997) 13 South African Journal of 
Human Rights 28 at 33 f. Other authors see the right deriving from section 32 only to be exer-
cised in terms of national legislation, see for instance Davis, Dennis ‘Access to Information’ in 
South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights, LexisNexis Butterworths (ed.), available at 
http://Butterworths.uct.ac.za, Chapter 26, p 1 [accessed 20 August 2007] at 26-9. 
32  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (note 24) at para 83 on item 23 
in schedule 5 of the Constitution, also see Corder (note 31) at 32 f. for the historical background 
of the interim construction. 
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Constitutional Court also regarded this period necessary33 because legislation for access 
to information would have to supply ‘detailed and complex provisions defining the na-
ture and limits of the right and the requisite conditions for its enforcement.’34 The three 
year period was considered consistent with the Constitutional Principles because the 
right of access to information was not a ‘universally accepted fundamental human right 
but [was] directed at promoting good government.’35 In case federal legislation would 
not have been enacted in time, the interim right granted in s 23 (2) (a) of Schedule 6 
would not have complied with Constitutional Principle IX.36 In that case, s 32 (1) of the 
Constitution would have come into direct operation.37
Additional to s 32, openness and transparency is repeatedly protected and promoted 
by the 1996 Constitution.38 Section 1 (d) stipulates that the Republic of South Africa is 
founded on the value of openness. By this section, the 1996 Constitution enshrined the 
values demanded by the constitutional principles VI and IX.39 The importance of this 
‘building block’40 of the South African constitutional democracy is emphasized by the 
fact that a qualified41 75 per cent majority of the National Assembly plus a 2/3 majority 
of the National Council of Provinces is needed in order to change the provision.42 
Transparency is also demanded by the right of just administrative action.43 Obviously, 
any information officer’s decision to grant or deny access to information is an adminis-
trative act, so PAIA’s procedure is closely linked with s 33 and the Promotion of Ad-
ministrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’).44 The matter of procedural fairness45 is espe-
cially related to transparency. The term cannot be confined ‘to the rules of natural 
justice’; it moreover refers to ‘the idea of a general duty to act fairly in a procedural 
                                                 
33  Still the Constitutional Court regarded the period ‘a long time for the necessary legislation to be 
put in place”, In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (note 24) at 
para 87. 
34  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (note 24) at para 83. 
35  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (note 24) at para 85. 
36  The Constitutional Court regarded the limitation of access to state-held information that is re-
quired for the exercise and protection of any right as unconstitutional, In re: Certification of the Con-
stitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (note 24) at para 83. 
37  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (note 24) at para 86. 
38  Corder (note 13) at 43. 
39  Corder (note 13) at 42 f. 
40  Corder (note 13) at 43. 
41  Needed is a 75per cent of the National Assembly’s members which refers to all members and not 
only to those attending the respective meeting. 
42  Section 74 (1) (a). 
43  Section 33 of the Constitution. 
44  McKinley (note 12) at 8 criticises the possible exception of PAIA-decisions as set out in sec-
tion 1 (i) (b) (hh) PAJA. The exception however covers only persons that are ‘other than organs 
of state’. 
45  Section 33 (1) of the Constitution. 
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sense’.46 An important part of procedural fairness is the right to receive written rea-
sons,47 which forms one of the core values of democracy by stating the need for justifi-
cation of an administrative action.48 Administrative action becomes transparent from an 
ex post-perspective because the public administration must give reasons for its actions 
no matter if it is rule-making, adjucating or making general administrative decisions.49 
Another element of administrative transparency envisioned by s 33 is the call for the 
publication of at least all binding if not also interpretative guidelines.50 Section 41 (1) (c) can 
be regarded as the blanket clause obliging the executive to provide a transparent gov-
ernment.51 Section 195 of the Constitution sets out the basic values and principles that 
govern public administration. It highlights the importance of transparency as a general 
principle of public administration and states how the rather undefined goal of transpar-
ency can be achieved by stipulating that the provided information has to be not only 
accessible but also timely and accurate. It therefore adds substance to the aim of an 
open democracy.52 Public administration must follow the values set out in s 195 as they 
form ‘justiciable standards, albeit somewhat broadly stated, against what the validity of 
administrative action is potentially reviewable.’53 According to subsection 195 (2), the 
administration in every sphere of government, organs of state and public enterprises are 
subjected to the principles of s 195. Nevertheless, the provision appears surplus regard-
ing s 41 (1) (c). Subsection 195 (3) pledges the national legislator to promote the princi-
ples of subsection (1). The Constitution provides for ‘access and involvement of the public’ 
concerning the statutory bodies of the National Assembly,54 the National Council of 
Provinces,55 the provincial legislatures,56 and municipal councils.57 Those provisions are 
leges speciales to the general principle of openness as set out in ss 41 (1) (c) and 195. It has 
been called a violation of ss 41 (1) (c) and 195 that there still hasn’t been any legislative 
                                                 
46  Corder (note 13) at 48. 
47  Section 33 (2) of the Constitution. 
48  Corder (note 13) at 41. For a determination of the scope of ‘administrative action’ see Corder 
(note 13) at 45 ff. 
49  Corder (note 13) at 50. 
50  White (note 26) at 71 f. regards every unpublished decision-making guideline that is used by the 
executive as secret law in violation of the rule of law. 
51  White (note 26) at 70. 
52  White (note 26) at 68. 
53  Corder (note 13) at 53. 
54  Section 59 (1). 
55  Section 72 (1). 
56  Section 118 (1). 
57  Section 160 (7). 
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implementation of ss 59 (1), 72 (1), 118 (1) and 160 (7).58 The business rules of the Na-
tional Assembly,59 the National Council of Provinces60 and the Provincial Legislatures61 
have to be made with ‘due regard to […] transparency and public involvement.’ Fur-
thermore, transparency has to be assured in financial matters as ‘[n]ational, provincial and 
municipal budgets and budgetary processes must promote transparency […].’62 To en-
sure transparency, ‘[n]ational legislation must establish a national treasury and prescribe 
measures […].’63 In addition, organs of state that want to contract for goods and services have 
to do so in accordance with a transparent system.64
                                                 
58  The drafted Open Democracy Bill included an ‘open meetings chapter’ implementing public 
access to governmental meetings. This chapter however has been deleted in the political process 
of the enactment; see White (note 26) at 70 f. 
59  Section 57 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
60  Section 70 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
61  Section 116 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
62  Section 215 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
63  Section 216 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
64  Section 217 (1) (b) of the Constitution. 
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C. The Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000 
PAIA has been enacted to comply with the constitutional demand of giving effect to the 
right of access to information.65 The statutory right of access to information supple-
ments the constitutional right contained in s 32 of the Constitution. National legislation 
for access to information was demanded soon after the Interim Constitution came into 
force.66 The process of drafting began as early as 199467 and the act finally came into 
operation on the 9th of March 2001 in a worldwide climate of freedom of information-
enactment.68 Certain parts of the freedom of information legislation of Australian, Ca-
nadian, Ireland, New Zealand and the U. S. have been used as models for PAIA.69 The 
act has been amended twice70 and in terms of the act,71 the minister may make and has 
made various regulations.72  
The foremost object of the act is to ‘give effect’ to s 32 of the Constitution.73 PAIA has 
to be interpreted purposively74 because of its special status as statute and supplementa-
tion of the constitutional right in s 32.75 Active implementation is essential as such right 
does not grow organically due to economical development but is rather a ‘political crea-
ture’ which has to be nourished and bolstered by and within civil society.76 The object 
of the act includes the ‘general promotion of transparency’ as it is envisaged by several 
                                                 
65  Section 32 (1) of the Constitution, see B.II. 
66  See eg ANC - RDP, § 5.9.1; Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 45 ff. 
67  In the drafting process the bill carried the name ‘Open Democracy Bill’; after withdrawal, 
changes and then re-introduction it has been given its actual name, see Currie/Klaaren (note 13) 
at 1.7 ff. 
68  See the table of nations with freedom of information laws worldwide at Ackermann/Sandoval-
Ballesteros (note 7) at 97 f. Also see Balisar (note 9) at 3; Mendel (note 7) at 18 ff; Open Society 
Institute ‘Transparency & Silence: A Survey of Access to Information Laws and Practices in 
Fourteen Countries’ (2006), available at http://www.justiceinitiative.org [accessed 24 August 2007] at 
21 ff, 66 ff. 
69  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 111; Currie/Klaaren (note 12) at 72. 
70  The amendments by the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 42 of 2001 and the Promotion of 
Access to Information Amendment Act 54 of 2002 can be considered technical, Currie/Klaaren 
(note 12) at 74; Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 1.13. 
71  Section 92 PAIA. 
72  See Reg No 187/2002, Reg No 1244/2003, Reg No 990/2006 and 466/2007, all available at 
www.info.gov.za. 
73  Section 9 (a) PAIA. 
74  Section 2 (1) PAIA; S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para 9. 
75  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.1. 
76  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 115 f; Balisar (note 9) at 7; Roberts, Alasdair ‘Ac-
cess to Government Information: An Overview of Issues’ in Public Management. Electronic 
journal, Issue 2, 22 October 2003, available at http://www.aroberts.us-research.htm [accessed 10 July 
2007] at 5. 
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provisions of the Constitution.77 These are useful for interpreting the act’s provisions as 
well as clarifying conflicts between openness and other public interests.78
The right of access to information is commonly recognized as a fundamental human 
right.79 It is usually seen as a part of the right to freedom of expression,80 a notion that is 
backed up by the wording of s 16 (1) (b) of the Constitution as well as by the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (‘UDHR’) and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).81 However, the fact that the right of access to information is 
explicitly acknowledged by the Constitution renders it somewhat independent from the 
right to freedom of expression.82 The right to access one’s personal information (habeas 
data) is associated with the right of human dignity.83 Although a constitutionally granted 
right of access to information has been conceived as unusual,84 it is explicitly recognized 
as a human right in over 40 countries’ constitutions.85
Access to information is not only a human right itself but also essential for the ex-
ercise of a variety of other fundamental rights.86 It is particularly important for the use 
of civil and political rights and for any democratic participation in society.87 Effective access 
to information transforms a ‘mere’ representative democracy into a participatory de-
mocracy that is not restricted to participation via election every X years.88 Individuals 
can only form and utter opinions that are worthy of being expressed if they have access 
                                                 
77  See above B.II. 
78  Mendel (note 7) at 124. 
79  Article 19 (Ed.), ‘The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and 
Access to Information’ (1996), available at http://article19.org [accessed 10 July 2007] at Preamble; 
Bovens (note 1) at 338 ff; McKinley (note 12) at 33; United Nations, General Assembly, ‘Resolu-
tion No. 59 (I), 14th December 1946, Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of In-
formation’, available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm [accessed 7 July 2007]. 
80  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 88; Article 19 (note 79) at Principle 1 (b); Davis 
(note 31) at 26-1; Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 46; Mendel (note 7) at 1 f (providing 
international jurisprudence on that notion at 16 ff); Rautenbach, IM ‘Introduction To The Bill 
Of Rights’ in Bill of Rights Compendium, LexisNexis Butterworths (ed.), available at 
http://Butterworths.uct.ac.za, Chapter 1A1 [accessed 21 August 2007] at 1A78.1; Roberts (note 76) 
at 1; Roberts, Alasdair ‘Structural Pluralism and the Right to Information’ (2001) 51 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 243 at 259 ff. 
81  See art 19 UDHR and art 19 (2) ICCPR. 
82  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 50. 
83  Mendel (note 7) at iv. 
84  Currie/Klaaren (note 12) at 72. 
85  Balisar (note 9) at 4. 
86  Like the right to freedom of religion, thought, belief and opinion, and to the political and educa-
tional rights, McKinley (note 12) at 33; Rautenbach (note 80) at 1A78.1; Roberts (note 76) at 1. 
87  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 92; Article 19 (note 79) at Preamble; Corder (note 
13) at 41; Davis (note 31) at 26-2; McKinley (note 12) at 1; Mendel (note 7) at iii; O’Brien (note 
6) at 59; Rautenbach (note 80) at 1A78.1; Roberts (note 76) at 1. 
88  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 92; Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 47. 
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to relevant governmental information.89 Thus, access to information is a prerequisite to 
making informed choices.90 In this context, the right of access to information can even 
be seen as a duty and responsibility, an ‘obligation to monitor the conduct of [governmen-
tal] agencies’,91 and especially as a countermeasure concerning corruption, hidden 
agreements and actions.92 General access to information is the only effective counter-
measure against censorship and ‘behind-the-scenes-channelling of vast amounts of 
state-controlled information’.93 It helps with encountering any kind of arbitrary state 
action and is necessary for building a system of citizenry consent.94 Therefore, the right 
of access to information generally helps to achieve what is commonly referred to as 
‘good governance’.95 Access to information has also been acknowledged as a means to 
promote third generation rights such as the socioeconomic rights established by the Constitu-
tion.96 Another central rationale for access to information is state accountability,97 which 
can only be achieved if citizens know what their government is doing and why, without 
being dependent on state-controlled information.98 This rationale was emphasized in 
Principle IX.99 Only through encouraging participation and strengthening accountability 
the administrative process can be improved. Additionally, to share information helps to 
guarantee that it is genuine and accurate as it is scrutinized by different individuals and 
therefore from different angles.100 Furthermore, a constant and trustworthy flow of in-
formation is indispensable for economy - there is no shorter way to put it than Acker-
mann/Sandoval-Ballesteros do: ‘[T]he market lives and dies on information.’101 Information 
is regarded as one of the keys for economic growth in developing countries.102 Another 
importance lies in the right to publish information and the right to freely distribute it 
                                                 
89  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 88. 
90  Bovens (note 1) at 324; Mendel (note 7) at iii f. 
91  Roberts (note 80) at 263 f. Different view: Bovens (note 1) at 332. 
92  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 92; Balisar (note 9) at 2 f; Mendel (note 7) at iv. 
93  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 47. 
94  Lidberg, Johan/Phillips, Gail/Tanner Stephen ‘The Freedom of Information Index: Measuring 
the gap between the promise and practise of freedom of information legislation’ (2003) 108 Free-
dom of Information Review 88 at 88; Roberts (note 76) at 1. 
95  In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (note 24) at para 85; Cur-
rie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.4. 
96  Klaaren, Jonathan ‘A Second Look at the South African Human Rights Commission, Access to 
Information, and the Promotion of Socioeconomic Rights’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 539 
at 554 ff. 
97  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 86 f; Lidberg/Phillips/Tanner (note 94) at 88; 
Mendel (note 7) at iv. 
98  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 47 f. 
99  See B.I. 
100  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 48. 
101  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 92. 
102  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 48 f. 
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without undue governmental restrictions.103 Besides, not only do citizens benefit from 
access to information, governments do as well: Openness and transparency help to de-
velop and strengthen citizens’ trust in governments’ actions and therefore is a matter of 
political marketing.104 These perspectives invite us to see the right to access to informa-
tion as a positive freedom and not merely as a negative right.105
I. Scope 
PAIA impresses with its generally wide scope.106 Its application is outstanding as it cov-
ers both public and private bodies.107 Furthermore it mostly uses broad definitions. Nearly 
everything is defined as ‘record’, regardless of the information’s form or medium, origin 
or age, as long as the information is recorded.108 Information is deemed to be a public 
record if it is under the possession or control of a public body.109 Records concerning 
pending civil or criminal procedure that can be obtained in other ways are excluded.110 
PAIA does not refer to ‘the state’ but distinguishes between ‘public bodies’ and ‘private 
bodies’.111 The definition of ‘public bodies’ does not include private bodies which are 
substantially publicly funded. However, the latter are encompassed by the definition of 
‘private bodies’, which only excludes non-commercial private activities of natural per-
sons; a limitation that is justifiable in terms of the right to privacy.112 The broad defini-
tions of PAIA are welcome as they give effect to the principle of maximum disclo-
sure.113 Another reason for the PAIA’s broad application is found within the power to 
override former secrecy law,114 which is an important but quite unusual feature compared 
to the worldwide situation on FOI-laws.115  
PAIA’s broad scope supports the general principles of its interpretation which include: 
Access to information as the rule, withholding of information as the exception which 
                                                 
103  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 45. 
104  Balisar (note 9) at 3. 
105  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 90. 
106  See the exceptions, C.III and the constitutional concerns they raise, C.V.2.a). 
107  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 100, 112 regard PAIA as ‘a model FOI-law.’ Also 
see Balisar (note 9) at 77; Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.6 f; Currie/Klaaren (note 12) at 72; 
McKinley (note 12) at 32; Mendel (note 7) at 69, 126; Roberts (note 76) at 2. 
108  This is subject to criticism, see C.V.2.a)aa). 
109  Sections 1, 3 PAIA. 
110  Section 7 PAIA. Further regarding access to information in the context of litigation see C.V.2.a). 
111  Both are defined in section 1 PAIA. 
112  Currie/Klaaren (note 12) at 72; Mendel (note 7) at, 70. 
113  Mendel (note 7) at 69.  
114  Section 5 PAIA. 
115  Mendel (note 7) at 131. 
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has to be interpreted narrowly, and the burden of proof rests on the party resisting dis-
closure.116
II. Procedure 
The PAIA is regarded as ‘one of the more complex and technical pieces of legislation 
that has come into operation since 1994.’117 It is characterised by a system of exceptions 
and counter-exceptions and strongly formalised procedures. 
The procedures of access to publicly and privately held information are largely over-
lapping. Therefore, the procedure will generally be outlined regarding publicly held in-
formation; thereupon the procedural differences of access to privately held information 
will be examined.118  
1. Records held by Public Bodies 
Everybody has the right to access the requested information as long as they comply with 
the procedural requirements set out by PAIA and no exception applies.119 A requester 
of publicly held information neither has to show, nor to prove any ‘need to know’.120  
a) General Procedure 
The central procedural institutions envisaged by PAIA are the information officers (‘IOs’). 
They have to be appointed by every public body and carry the responsibility for infor-
mational requests. The name and contact details of every IO must to be published in 
every general use telephone book.121 Furthermore, there has to be a sufficient number 
of deputy IOs appointed to render the public body as accessible as reasonably possible.122
The request must allow the IO to identify the sought after information and deter-
mine the manner of access. Requests can be submitted in writing or orally. However, if 
submitted orally, IOs have to write the request down and must furnish requesters with a 
copy.123 Information officers have a duty to assist the requester - without assistance no 
request shall be turned down.124 Requesters have to be informed in writing about the 
                                                 
116  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.10. 
117  McKinley (note 12) at 11. 
118  See C.II.2. 
119  Section 11 PAIA. 
120  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 5.6. 
121  Section 16 PAIA. 
122  Section 17 PAIA. 
123  Section 18 PAIA. 
124  Section 19 PAIA. 
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outcome of their requests and if the request is granted, the notice shall stipulate such, 
the fees to be charged, the form in which access will be given and the right to appeal the 
fee. If the request is refused, in whole or in part, the notice must include adequate rea-
sons for the denial, along with the provision of the Act relied upon, as well as the right 
to appeal the decision.125  
If the record in question is not in the possession of the body where the request has 
been filed or the record is more closely connected with another body, the request must 
be transferred as quickly as possible to the correct body, in any event within 14 days 
(not additional to the overall time limit) and the requester has to be notified.126 In case 
the record cannot be found, the requested body has to take all reasonable steps to find 
the record; if it still cannot be found, the requester has to be notified which is then 
deemed to be a refusal.127
The PAIA provides in detail for the form of access that can be granted, including in-
spection or viewing of the record, (electronic or photomechanical) copies, transcripts, or 
extraction of the information from the record by a machine.128 Generally, access must 
be granted in the form and language requested.129 
Information officers of public bodies must publish manuals on how to access infor-
mation.130 Furthermore, information might be published and made available without 
request, although the act encompasses no such duty to publish certain information.131
The act includes a system of graded fees regarding the search, preparation and reproduc-
tion of information requested from public and private bodies.132 The Minister can enact 
regulations concerning the fee system, especially to alleviate the burden on requesters 
where necessary.133 Records have to be made accessible to the handicapped without 
extra charge.134 The applied fees are subject to internal and external review.135
                                                 
125  Section 25 (3) PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 56 (3) PAIA (records of private bod-
ies). 
126  Section 20 PAIA. 
127  Section 23 PAIA. 
128  Section 29 (2) PAIA. 
129  Section 29 (3) PAIA. 
130  Section 14 PAIA. 
131  Section 15 PAIA. 
132  Section 22 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 54 PAIA (records of private bodies). A 
graded system of fees has been suggested early, see Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 55. 
133  Section 22 (8) PAIA 
134  Section 29 (6) PAIA. 
135  Section 74 (1) (b) PAIA read together with Section 22 PAIA. 
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b) Remedies against Non-disclosure 
PAIA provides two levels of remedies against a non-disclosure decision. After a first 
internal appeal is exhausted, the requester can approach the courts in a second step. 
aa) Internal Appeal 
The internal appeal applies only to national government departments, provincial gov-
ernment departments and local authorities.136 Furthermore, it is only possible to appeal 
against the types of decisions contemplated in s 74 (1). The appeal is conducted by the 
responsible Cabinet Minister as the ‘relevant authority’ in terms of PAIA.137 It can be 
lodged by the requester or a third party and can include various things such as the non-
disclosure itself, imposed fees, form of access or extension of time limits.138 The appeal 
must be lodged within 60 days139 and in the prescribed form. There are detailed provi-
sions concerning third party intervention.140 The appeal has to be decided as soon as 
possible, latest within 30 days.141 The decision has to give reasons and must be provided 
to both the appellant and any third party along with their right to appeal to the courts.142
bb) Applications to Court 
Court applications aim for ‘appropriate relief’ and have to be lodged within 30 days143 
after receiving the negative decision of the internal appeal. Both, requesters as well as 
involved third parties have locus standi.144 Non-disclosure proceedings before court are of 
a civil character.145 The judicial review is confined to certain decisions made in terms of 
the PAIA.146 The court has the power to review for lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural 
fairness, but not for the merits of the decision.147 It further is enabled to examine any of 
the records in question but is not allowed to disclose them to the requester during the 
proceedings.148 The onus is on the body that insists on non-disclosure.149
                                                 
136  Section 74 (1) PAIA read together with section 1 PAIA, definition of ‘public body’, (a). 
137  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 9.3. McKinley (note 12) at criticises the lack of clarity as it comes to 
internal departmental accountability. 
138  Section 74 (1) PAIA. 
139  Section 75 (1) (a) PAIA. It has to be lodged within 30 days if third party notification is required. 
140  Sections 74-76 PAIA. 
141  Section 77 (3) (a) PAIA. 
142  Section 77 (4), (5) PAIA. 
143  Within 30 days if third party notification is required. 
144  Section 78 (2), (3) PAIA. 
145  Section 81 (1) PAIA. 
146  Section 78 (2), (3) PAIA. 
147  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 9.9, 9.13. 
148  Section 80 PAIA. 
149  Section 81 (3) PAIA. 
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In its decision, the court may grant any order that is just and equitable. It can either con-
firm or set aside the internal decision of the body. Notably, the court can substitute an 
official’s decision instead of just remanding it.150 It may also require an information offi-
cer to take or refrain from certain actions within a certain period of time and can grant 
an interdict, interim or specific relief, a declaratory order or compensation and order as 
to costs.151 When interpreting the PAIA, courts have to prefer any reasonable interpreta-
tion which is consistent with the objects of the Act over any other interpretation.152
2. Records held by private Bodies 
Section 50 of PAIA requires private corporations and non-profit organizations to establish 
transparency.153 This makes the question of whether there is horizontal application of 
s 32 of the Constitution irrelevant.154 The right to access privately-held information is re-
ferred to as ‘tertiary information right’ because the role of the government is restricted to 
establishing a suitable legal framework.155
This right’s potential is crucial as it can help to prevent the government from find-
ing ‘a way to slip out the back door’ by transferring public powers or surrendering for-
mer knowledge monopolies onto private entities.156 Nevertheless, access is not limited 
to information held by private persons that exercise public power.157 It has been noted 
positively that the PAIA covers most parastatal entities.158 On the other side of the coin, 
the extension of the right of access into private bodies also allows public bodies to seek 
privately held information. This is a considerable expansion and not required to ‘give 
effect’ to s 32 (1).159
The classification of private bodies seems to be somewhat blurred. Judge Cameron J 
pointed out that economically important companies, which are providing essential ser-
vices to the public, 
                                                 
150  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 9.16. 
151  Section 82 PAIA. 
152  Section 2 (1) PAIA. 
153  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 100. 
154  This has been denied by Griesel J in Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Others v 
African National Congress and Others 2005 (10) BCLR 995 (C).  
155  Bovens (note 1) at 327. 
156  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 123 f; Bovens (note 1) at 325, 335; McKinley (note 
12) at 6 f; Open Society Institute (note 68) at 153 ff; Roberts (note 80) at 243 f. 
157  This had been proposed by Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 53 f, yet s 50 PAIA knows 
no such limitation. 
158  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 153 f. 
159  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.6. 
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‘though not ‘public bodies’ under PAIA, should be treated as more amenable to the statutory 
purpose of promoting transparency, accountability and effective governance’.160
This would lead to a category of ‘rather public private [bodies]’.161
a) General Procedure 
The general procedure of access to information held by private bodies is similar to the 
procedure concerning information held by public bodies as outlined above.162
b) Qualification 
Requesters of privately held information have to show that they require it for the exer-
cise or protection of any of their rights.163 This constitutional limit is needed because 
s 8 (2) of the Constitution otherwise would have caused broad application of the right in 
private relations.164 Its purpose is to ‘avoid burdening private bodies with a duty to pro-
vide [information] to the merely curious.’165
The qualification raised several issues regarding the interpretation of the terms 
‘rights’ and ‘required’. The former must not be construed in a narrow way as ‘needed for 
litigation’;166 there are other contexts giving a justified interest in information. The 
judgements decided on issues of s 23 of the Interim Constitution remain relevant for the 
interpretation of s 32 of the Constitution or s 50 PAIA as far as their wording is the 
same.167 Nevertheless, as the qualification now only is needed in regard to privately held 
information, ie in cases of horizontal application, the terms ‘required’ and ‘rights’ might 
be interpreted narrower than in cases of vertical application.168 It has been stated that 
the term ‘required’ 
‘should be given a generous and purposive interpretation. It should not be restrictively inter-
preted […]. While it [...] does not mean 'dire necessity' or 'desired', it is not possible to give 
the word a precise meaning. The enquiry in each case should be a factual one: is the informa-
tion required for the protection or exercise of a person's rights?’169
                                                 
160  Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk [2006] SCA 32 (RSA) at para 40. 
161  Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk  (note 160) at para 42. 
162  See C.II.1.a). 
163  Section 32 (1) (b) of the Constitution, section 50 (1) (a) PAIA. 
164  Rautenbach (note 80) at 1A78.2. 
165  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 5.7. 
166  Uni Windows CC v East London Municipality 1995 (8) BCLR 1091 (E), 1095 F–H; Johannes-
sen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 49 f. 
167  Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v Davis [2005] 2 All SA 225 (SCA), paras 11 ff; Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk  (note 
160) at para 15; Davis (note 31) at 26-9 and 26-13. 
168  Davis (note 31) at 26-9 suggests the approach found in Inkatha Freedom Party and Another v Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and Another 2000 (5) BCLR 534 (C) at 135; Currie/Klaaren (note 13) 
at 5.12 submit that merely fundamental rights should be protected. 
169  Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 1994 (4) SA 225 (W). 
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This notion has been supported.170
Narrower interpretations of the term ‘required’ have been suggested as well. It was held 
that the term ‘required’ ‘conveys an element of need: the information does not have to 
be essential, but it certainly has to be more than “useful”’.171 Today it can be regarded as 
settled that the information is needed to be ‘of assistance’ to the requester.172 The word 
‘required’ has to be construed as ‘reasonably required’,173 which again can only be done 
with close reference to the specific facts of each case.174 For disclosure the applicant has 
to show ‘what the right is that he wishes to exercise or protect, what the information is 
which is required and how that information will assist him in exercising or protecting 
that right.’175 Therefore, requesters have to elaborate on the fact of what benefit can be 
derived from the requested record.176 Requesters have to ‘show a risk of harm to a right 
if there is no transparency.’177 This requirement is naturally eased by the fact that re-
questers have no insight into the record when requesting it. Therefore the IO can only 
oblige requesters to bring forth reason why they think or hope the record may be of some 
benefit.178
Another important question has been how the term ‘rights’ must be interpreted. It 
has been stated that as the right of access to information is included in the Bill of 
Rights, it only provides means for protecting fundamental rights which therefore should be 
the only ‘rights’ referred to.179 This narrow interpretation must be criticised because the 
wording of s 32 is broad and unlimited (‘any rights’) and its purpose is to promote open 
and accountable government.180 The corresponding right does not even have to be one 
of the requester - as s 50 stipulates ‘any right’ to be sufficient it might also be a right of a 
                                                 
170  Truth and Reconciliation Commission v Du Preez and Another 1996 (8) BCLR 1123 (C) at 1134. 
171  Shabalala and Others v The Attorney-General of Transvaal and Others 1994 (6) BCLR 85 (T), 101  
A-B. 
172  Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC and Others 2001 (10) BCLR 
1026 (SCA) at para 28; Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk  (note 160) at 16. 
173  Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Others v African National Congress and Others 
(note 154) at para 34; Nortje and Another v Attorney-General of the Cape and Another 1995 (2) BCLR 
236 (C), 250 H-J; Van Huyssteen NO and Others v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
Others 1995 (9) BCLR 1191 (C); Clutchco (Pty) Ltd v Davis (note 167) at para 13. 
174  Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk  (note 160) at para 18; Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 5.11. 
175  Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC and Others (note 172) at para 
28. 
176  Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk  (note 160) at para 11. 
177  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.8. 
178  Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk  (note 160) at paras 23 f. 
179  Directory Advertising Cost Cutters CC v Minister for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting and Others 
1996 2 All SA 83 (T) at 94. 
180  Van Niekerk v City Council of Pretoria 1997 1 All SA 305 (T) at 312. 
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third person or a right of ‘the public’.181 In the judgement of Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa (IDASA) and Others v African National Congress and Others, Judge Griesel J 
adopted a narrow approach in two regards. First, it was stated that ‘rights’ would not 
include mere ‘values’ because the latter were directed at the government and not oblig-
ing private bodies in any way.182 Second, the right the requester seeks to protect would 
have to correspond with a duty imposed on the requested body at the same time.183 The 
connection between right and duty, however, must not be interpreted too narrowly. The 
wording of s 50 PAIA and s 32 of the Constitution clearly allows the protection of ‘any’ 
right. This must include such rights that are imposing duties on other bodies than those 
requested. The section’s purpose is not only to use disclosure to prevent the requested body 
from infringing on one’s right but to allow the requester to exercise and protect the right 
in question efficiently. The right might be exercised elsewhere and might need to be pro-
tected from other persons than the requested body. If one agrees with Judge Griesel de-
manding a strict right-duty-relationship, the possible outcome would be paradox: the 
perpetrating person could evade disclosure simply by transferring the sought record to 
another body because then the infringing body on the one side and the information 
holding bodies on the other side would be different persons. Therefore, the right sought 
to be protected or exercised and the duty would not correspond anymore and the re-
quest could be turned down. Consequently, other judgements have stated that every right 
is included, regardless of which origin184 and whether or not it is directed against the 
state or a private person.185  
III. Grounds for Refusal 
There is broad consent that access to information cannot be granted without limits.186 
Legitimate interests of the government (such as matters of defence or national security) 
as well as of private persons (such as privacy and trade secrets) deserve protection from 
                                                 
181  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 5.7, 5.12. 
182  Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Others v African National Congress and Others 
(note 154) at para 40 and Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention (NICRO) 
and Others 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) at para 21 considered sections 1, 41(1)(c), 152(1)(a) and 
195(1) to be such values. 
183  Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) and Others v African National Congress and Others 
(note 154) at para 47. 
184  Aquafund (Pty) Ltd v Premier of the Province of the Western Cape 1997 (7) BCLR 907 (C) at 915 f; Le-
bowa Granite (Pty) Ltd v Lebowa Mineral Trust and Another, 1999 (8) BCL 908 (T) at 915; Van 
Niekerk v City Council of Pretoria (note 180) at 309 f; Nisec (Pty) Ltd v Western Cape Provincial Tender 
Board and Others, 1998 (3) SA 228 (C) at 237 B-E. 
185  Le Roux v Direkteur-Generaal van Handel en Nywerheid 1997 (8) BCLR 1048 (T) at 1055 f. 
186  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 55 f; Mendel (note 7) at 28; Roberts (note 76) at 2. 
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interminable access by citizens or competitors.187 The protection and balance of other 
fundamental rights and important aspects of the public interest represent a legitimate 
purpose.188  
One central concern is the abuse of access to information by powerful private or-
ganizations.189 Another concern is that disclosure of governmental information will 
eventually undermine the authority of government and its efficiency.190 Regarding ad-
ministration efficiency, exemptions are likely to become a big part of any freedom of 
information legislation because although  
‘in the long run [access to information] significantly improve[s] governance, [it does] not repre-
sent an immediate benefit for those who are in power. FOI laws open the government to exter-
nal scrutiny, making elites much more vulnerable to outside criticism […]. […] Government 
leaders ‘as a group’ do not favour FOI laws because it is not in their interest to do so.’191
Nevertheless, limitations generally should adhere to certain standards to be justifi-
able and to leave an FOI-act capable. Such standards are suggested by the Johannesburg 
Principles which stipulate that limitations should be exercised narrowly,192 be subject to a 
necessity of harm-test193 as well as to a public interest-override194 and an independent 
review in case of denial.195
The PAIA allows refusal on various grounds for both publicly196 and privately197 
held records. The act encompasses grounds of refusal rooted in the nature of the infor-
mation198 and it stipulates the need for balancing the right to information with other 
rights of the Bill of Rights.199 Furthermore, there are institutional exceptions excluding the 
cabinet and its committees,200 courts and certain special tribunals as far as their judicial 
                                                 
187  For a list of commonly found exemptions (‘international standard exemptions’) see Open Soci-
ety Institute (note 68) at 148. 
188  Currie/Klaaren (note 12) at 73. 
189  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 49, 51 f. 
190  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 52. 
191  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 121. 
192  Article 19 (note 79) at Principle 12. 
193  Article 19 (note 79) at Principle 15. 
194  Article 19 (note 79) at Principle 13. 
195  Article 19 (note 79) at Principle 14. 
196  Sections 33-46 PAIA. 
197  Sections 62-70 PAIA. 
198  Section 9 (b) (i) PAIA names the protection of privacy, commercial confidentiality and effective 
and good governance. Other purposes envisaged by the act include the protection of life and 
physical safety, the security and protection of buildings and security systems, law enforcement, 
criminal and civil procedure, privilege, defence, security and international relations, the economic 
interests and financial welfare of the state and research information, see Rautenbach (note 80) at 
1A78.3. 
199  Section 9 (b) (ii) PAIA. 
200  Section 12 (a) PAIA. 
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functions are concerned201 and individual members of parliament or a provincial legisla-
ture in their capacity.202 Various grounds of refusal apply regardless if the information is 
privately or publicly held, so does the exception for the protection of the privacy of a 
third party being a natural person,203 commercial information of a third party,204 confidential 
information,205 safety and property of individuals,206 records privileged from production in legal pro-
ceedings207 and research information of third parties and public bodies.208 Other grounds of 
refusal only apply to information held by public bodies. Such grounds include the pro-
tection of certain records of the South African Revenue Service,209 police dockets in bail 
proceedings and law enforcement and other legal proceedings,210 matters of defence, security and inter-
national relations of the state,211 economic interests and financial welfare of the state and commer-
cial activities of public bodies,212 commercial information213 and public bodies’ operations.214 Fur-
thermore, requests that are manifestly frivolous or vexatious, or form a substantial and 
unreasonable diversion of resources can be turned down.215 There are no substantial 
grounds for refusal that solely apply to private bodies. There are mandatory and discretional 
grounds for refusal concerning publicly216 and privately217 held information. The PAIA 
is ‘both an access law and a secret law’ because it encompasses mandatory refusal 
grounds.218 The phrase ‘may not’ must be interpreted as ‘must not’, forming a manda-
tory ground of refusal.219 This makes most grounds mandatory,220 so the previously ar-
rogated221 general discretionary disclosure of records has not become law. Some limita-
                                                 
201  Section 12 (b) (i) to (iii) PAIA. 
202  Section 12 (c) PAIA. 
203  Section 34 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 63 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
204  Section 36 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 64 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
205  Section 37 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 65 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
206  Section 38 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 66 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
207  Section 40 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 67 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
208  Section 43 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 69 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
209  Section 35 PAIA. 
210  Section 39 PAIA. 
211  Section 41 PAIA. 
212  Section 42 PAIA. 
213  Section 42 (3) PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 68 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
214  Section 44 PAIA. 
215  Section 45 PAIA. 
216  Mandatory grounds: Sections 34 (1), 35 (1), 36 (1), 37 (1) (a), 38 (a), 39 (1) (a), 40 and 43 (1) PAIA 
read together with section 33 (1) (a) PAIA. 
Discretionary grounds: Sections 37 (1) (b), 38 (b), 39 (1) (b), 41 (1) (a) and (b), 42 (1) and (3), 43 (2), 
44 (1) and (2) and 45 PAIA read together with section 33 (1) (b) PAIA. 
217  Mandatory grounds: Sections 63 (1), 64 (1), 65, 66 (a), 67, 69 (1) PAIA. 
Discretionary grounds: Sections 66 (b), 68 (1), 69 (2) PAIA. 
218  Mendel (note 7) at 73.  
219  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 7.7. 
220  See Chapter 4 of PAIA. 
221  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 56. 
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tions can be found outside PAIA.222 Most, but not all223 of the exceptions are subject to 
some kind of necessity of harm clause. Those clauses are incorporated into the specific pro-
vision. The phrases ‘likely to’ and ‘reasonably expected to’ are used to describe the like-
liness of the harmful consequences triggered by the disclosure. The former phrase calls 
for a narrower test than the latter.224  
All grounds of refusal are subject to a public interest override,225 a severability clause226 and 
to independent review.227 PAIA’s grounds of refusal are exhaustive and the act itself provides 
for their narrow interpretation.228 The onus is on the refusing body.229 It has been positively 
remarked, that in international comparison PAIA’s limitations are narrowly drawn and 
often subject to counter-exceptions to limit the scope of non-disclosure.230
IV. Enforcement 
Any right of access to information is only as valuable as it is enforceable,231 especially 
‘since the culture of bureaucracy typically works against the automatic implementation 
of openness.’232 Therefore, the PAIA depends strongly on institutional support by its 
very nature.233 Preferably, access to information should be enforced by a special inde-
pendent institution,234 as enforcement by the courts is slow and cost intensive.235 Never-
theless, it is more important to vest whatever enforcement institution with appropriate 
powers than to insist on a special body.236 Furthermore, it is important to guard that 
                                                 
222  See for instance the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 which is concerned with the protec-
tion of whistleblowers. 
223  Section 44 (1) (a) PAIA (operation of public bodies) is not, while Section 44 (1) (b) PAIA again 
encompasses some kind of harm test. 
224  For further interpretation of these phrases see Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at.3. 
225  Section 46 PAIA (for public records) and section 70 PAIA (for private records). 
226  Section 28 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 59 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
227  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 7.2. 
228  Section 33 PAIA, see Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 7.4. 
229  Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at para 44. Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 9.15. At 7.3 
however they note that the onus may be ‘more lenient’ in case of ‘important’ rights or interest 
that are protected. This raises the question where and by whom the line should be drawn be-
tween ‘important’ and ‘not so important’ grounds of refusal. Furthermore it remains unclear 
what a ‘lenient onus’ is supposed to be. 
230  Mendel (note 7) at 73. 
231  McKinley (note 12) at 29; Roberts (note 76) at 4; White (note 26) at 74. 
232  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 105. 
233  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 10.3. 
234  Balisar (note 9) at 5 f; Mendel (note 7) at 32. 
235  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 104. 
236  Mendel (note 7) at 33; also see the international comparison at Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros 
(note 7) at 105 f. 
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body from political interference as it is primarily public bodies that are subject to en-
forcement.237
The PAIA itself provides two overseers for its implementation, the South African 
Human Rights Commission (‘HRC’) and the High Courts. Special institutions have not been 
established.238 The HRC is entrusted with various tasks, for instance, it must publish an 
easily understandable guide on how to use PAIA239 and provide an annual report to the 
National Assembly on the functioning of the Act.240 Furthermore, it is collecting manu-
als on access to information which must be issued by public bodies.241 Nevertheless, as 
the HRC is ‘cash-strapped, […] notoriously understaffed and overstretched’ and at the 
same time not additionally funded for its newly designated tasks, it is virtually incapable 
of effective enforcement of the PAIA.242 In its 5th Annual Report, the Commission had 
to admit that it has not had the capacity to do any work relating to PAIA due to lack of 
funding.243 While underfunding is a general problem of the Chapter 9-institutions,244 it 
has been noted that the ‘HRC has failed even to partially fulfil [its] mandate’.245 The 
problem of sufficient funding is addressed by the PAIA itself because it obliges Parlia-
ment to allocate funds needed for purposes of the PAIA.246 On the one hand this has 
the potential of undermining the goals of the PAIA as it creates the ironical situation 
that the enforcing institution is dependent on the fiscal goodwill of the government 
which, at the same time, is subject to that enforcement.247 On the other hand, there is 
no real alternative because any state enforcement agency depends on the state for funds. 
Even if one would incorporate a provision stipulating a certain or relative amount of 
funds this provision could be amended by Parliament again. Therefore, sufficient fund-
ing will always depend on government’s goodwill. The implementation outcome of 
                                                 
237  Mendel (note 7) at 32 f. 
238  The suggested Open Democracy Commission as well as specialised Information Courts have not 
been established, White (note 26) at 74. 
239  Section 10 PAIA; South African Human Rights Commission ‘The Guide on how to use the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act - Act 2 of 2000 -’, available at http://www.sahrc.org [ac-
cessed 6 July 2007] at 8 ff. 
240  Section 84 PAIA. 
241  For further tasks see Section 83 PAIA and Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 11.3 ff. 
242  Balisar (note 9) at 78; White (note 26) at 74 f.  
243  South African Human Rights Commission ‘5th Annual Report: January 2000-March 2001’, avail-
able at http://www.sahrc.org [accessed 6 July 2007] at 6 f. 
244  Corder (note 13) at 44. 
245  McKinley (note 12) at 10, 14. 
246  Section 85 PAIA. 
247  McKinley (note 12) at 6. 
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PAIA is worrisome: In average only 23 per cent of the requests have been fulfilled in 
South Africa so far.248
V. Evaluating PAIA 
This chapter will briefly outline the constitutional test that has to be applied to the 
PAIA. Thereupon criticism regarding the act’s scope, its refusal grounds and its proce-
dure will be examined to isolate problems of constitutionality. 
1. Scope of the Constitutional Test 
The constitutional test regarding the PAIA consists of two provisions of the Constitu-
tion: s 32 (2) as internal limitation and s 36 as general limitation clause. Additionally, 
PAIA’s public interest override249 has to be taken into account because it is working as a 
last ‘safety valve’250 that allows disclosure of (generally ‘protected’) records in certain 
cases of hardship. Whenever the constitutionality of the PAIA is tested for certain rea-
sons, ss 46 and 70 have to be applied first to see if the outcome is capable of justifying 
the limit itself.251 While the constitutional test can only be outlined briefly here, it will be 
applied on limitations in detail at the respective chapters. 
a) Section 32 (2) of the Constitution 
Section 32 (2) obliges the law-giver to ‘give effect’ to the right of access to information. 
That constitutional mandate necessarily raises the question what kind of ‘effect’ is 
meant. Section 32 (2) cannot be viewed on its own. To answer this question one has to 
bear in mind the culture of transparency as it is entrenched in several provisions of the 
two Constitutions.252 In this context, ‘to give effect’ is to be understood as ‘“make effec-
tive”, “promote” or “implement”’ which encompasses the duty to set out enforcement 
procedures.253 PAIA therefore has to be substantially effective as the central instrument for 
achieving transparency. Furthermore, s 32 (2) serves as a special limitation clause which sup-
plements the general limitation clause of s 36. The clause makes limitation of the right 
easier in certain regards.254 It explicitly allows the law-giver to ‘provide reasonable measures 
                                                 
248  Compared to for instance 41 per cent in Armenia, see Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) 
at 126. 
249  Section 46 PAIA (public records) and section 70 PAIA (private records). 
250  Davis (note 31) at 26-12. 
251  Davis (note 31) at 26-12. 
252  See B ff. 
253  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.2. 
254  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.16. 
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to alleviate the administrative and financial burden on the state’255 that is caused by ac-
cess to information. The subsection expressively allows administrative and financial 
considerations to serve as purposes for limitation, ends that otherwise would be of little 
persuasion for the limitation of a fundamental right.256 The concept of reasonability is 
also enclosed in s 36; subsection (2) therefore is to be read as lex specialis when dealing 
with limitations that are made for the purpose of alleviating the administrative or finan-
cial burden.257 Any limitation, however, must leave the right intact - otherwise it would 
not have been given ‘effect’ to. With regards to limitations not apparently related to the 
administrative or financial burden, s 32 (2) does not apply but the limitation has to be 
tested against the general limitation clause of s 36.258 After all, the subsection primarily 
exists to justify PAIA’s fee system.259
b) Section 36 of the Constitution 
Any limitations of the rights in the Bill of Rights have to comply with s 36 of the Con-
stitution. Section 36 supplements the internal limitation of s 32 (2) PAIA. Sec-
tion 36 (1) (a) stipulates that such limitation by the state must be reasonable and justifi-
able in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality.260  
The constitutional test of s 36 consists of two parts: First, a value based determina-
tion of the ambit of a fundamental right must be made; it must be shown that the con-
duct in question falls within that ambit and that the right has been limited. Second, it 
must be examined if the limitation can be justified in terms of s 36.261 During that stage, 
right and limitation must be balanced according to s 36,262 which demands that limita-
tions have to be of general application and must be tested taking into account the nature 
of the right,263 the importance of the purpose of the limitation,264 the nature and extent 
of the limitation,265 the relation between the limitation and its purpose266 and less restric-
                                                 
255  Emphasis added. 
256  Rautenbach (note 80) at 1A78.3. 
257  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.16. 
258  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.16; Davis (note 31) at 26-12. 
259  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.16. 
260  One example is the refusal of a suspect’s access to a police file during investigations, see Khala v 
Minister of Safety and Security (note 169) at 236 f. 
261  S v Makwanyane and Another  (note 74) at paras 100 ff; Woolman, Stu/Botha, Henk, ‘Limitations’ 
in Woolman, Stuart/Roux, Theunis/Bishop, Michael, ‘Constitutional Law of South Africa’, 2nd edi-
tion, loose leaf (Service: March 2007), Chapter 34 at 34-3 ff. 
262  Woolman, Stu/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-18 ff. 
263  Further see Woolman, Stu/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-70 ff. 
264  Further see Woolman, Stu/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-73 ff. 
265  Further see Woolman, Stuart/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-79 ff. 
266  Further see Woolman, Stuart/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-84 f. 
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tive means to achieve the purpose.267 The competing values listed in s 36 (1) have to be 
weighed and assessed based on proportionality.268 PAIA can be used to limit s 32 be-
cause the act fulfils all criteria of a ‘law of general application’ (parity of treatment, non-
arbitrariness, accessibility or public availability and clarity).269 In order to limit the right 
of access to information, the state has to discharge a heavy onus.270
2. Constitutionality 
Some tend to say that ‘the gap between the promise and the practise of information 
legislation’ generally tends to be rather big,271 but there are also more tangible features to 
measure the effectiveness against. Mendel has stipulated nine basic principles which are-
supported by various international instruments.272 These principles include the principle 
of maximum disclosure,273 the obligation to publish key information,274 an active promotion of 
open government,275 clearly and narrowly drawn exceptions,276 fair and rapid processes facilitating 
access,277 unprohibitive costs,278 open public body meetings, disclosure taking precedence over conflicting 
laws279 and protection for whistleblowers.280 Those FOI-values help to interpret the act ac-
cording to its purpose and as far as they are incorporated and protected by the Constitu-
tion, they help determine its constitutionality. 
a) Criticising PAIA’s Scope and Grounds of Refusal 
Despite the voices lauding PAIA’s progressiveness, the act is often criticised for its 
grounds of refusal. While concerns about the latters’ amount and scope are alleviated by the 
fact that all exemptions are subject to a public interest override,281 one nevertheless has 
to bear in mind that disclosure is stipulated as the rule and non-disclosure as the exemp-
                                                 
267  Further see Woolman, Stuart/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-85 ff; Rautenbach (note 80) at 
1A66 ff. 
268  S v Makwanyane and Another  (note 74) at para 104; S v Manamela and Another (Director-General of 
Justice Intervening) 2000 (5) BCLR 491 (CC) at para 32; S v Bhulwana 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC) at 
paras 17 f.; Prince v President of the Cape Law Society and Others 2002 (3) BCLR 231 (CC) at para 45. 
269  Woolman, Stu/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-47 ff. 
270  Davis (note 31) at 26-3; Woolman, Stu/Botha, Henk (note 261) at 34-42 ff, 34-61 ff. 
271  Lidberg/Phillips/Tanner (note 94) at 88. 
272  See Mendel (note 7) at 23 f. 
273  Mendel (note 7) at 25 f. 
274  Mendel (note 7) at 26 f. 
275  Mendel (note 7) at 27 f. 
276  Mendel (note 7) at 28 ff. 
277  Mendel (note 7) at 31 ff. 
278  Mendel (note 7) at 33. 
279  Mendel (note 7) at 34 f. 
280  Mendel (note 7) at 35 f. 
281  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 103; Mendel (note 7) at 30 sees a public interest 
override as mandatory condition to any limitation. 
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tion by PAIA and s 32 of the constitution. Otherwise, the act reprobates to an instru-
ment of limitation instead of the promotion of freedom of information.282 Therefore, 
limitations to the right of access to information generally have to be interpreted nar-
rowly,283 which includes for instance, the duty to partial disclosure if parts of the record 
are severable from exempted information.284  
The justification of limitations depends on various issues as the concept of the spe-
cific limitation itself, the question of who decides over it or on what grounds,285 and 
whether there is a public interest override as a safeguard.286 Limitations by the nature of 
information generally can be justified easier than such by its class or source.287 Conflicting 
interests of the informant, the requester and third parties must also be balanced. When 
requesting information from private bodies, additional limitations might emanate from 
the Bill of Rights’ horizontal application. For instance, the right to privacy might have to 
be considered to determine how much and which information can be collected, filed or 
published.288
aa) No Access to ‘Any Information’ 
The most basic criticism is directed at PAIA’s object itself. The act grants access to any 
‘records’.289 Despite the broad definition of ‘record’,290 this term apparently only includes 
recorded information. The Constitution, however, obliges the legislation to establish 
access to ‘any information’, a wording that also includes information, which is not physi-
cally recorded.291 Leaving unrecorded information completely out of PAIA’s scope 
opens up a loophole that allows one to evade the act’s purpose, eg by issuing guidelines 
or orders not to record sensible information. Such an order or guideline wouldn’t even 
constitute an offence in terms of the act because s 90 merely sanctions any negative 
conduct regarding existing records but not the omission of producing them (except for 
                                                 
282  As it has happened in Zimbabwe, Serbia and Paraguay, see Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros 
(note 7) at 109, 114 f; Balisar (note 9) at 7, 96; Mendel (note 7) at vi. 
283  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 2.10; Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 46, 56.  
284  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 56; Mendel (note 7) at 31. 
285  For example if there is a ‘necessity of harm’ clause. 
286  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 101 f; Mendel (note 7) at 30. 
287  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 56. 
288  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 46 f consider this the main problem which had to be 
dealt with by a ‘carefully drafted instrument’. 
289  Section 11 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 50 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
290  Section 1 PAIA. 
291  Section 32 (1) of the Constitution. 
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section 14 manuals).292 The PAIA does not ‘give effect’ to s 32 insofar as it does not 
encompass unrecorded information.293  
However, this limitation of PAIA’s scope is justifiable by the nature of the right and the 
limitation. Any right of access to information must be workable. Merely memorized 
information is difficult to locate because the requested official can neither know 
whether that information exists at all nor in whose head it can be found. Even if it can 
be ‘located’, say by referring the requester to an official with expertise on the requested 
field of information, there is still no guarantee that the information will be replicated 
correctly by that person. Furthermore, there is no evidence or control about informa-
tion that just exists in somebody’s head. Despite the wording ‘any information’, the re-
striction to recorded information is needed in practical terms considering the nature of 
the right and is therefore justified. 
bb) Institutional Exceptions 
Section 12 PAIA provides institutional limitations. Records of cabinet and its commit-
tees, courts and certain special tribunals as far as their judicial functions are concerned 
and individual members of parliament or a provincial legislature in their capacity cannot 
be accessed via PAIA. 
(1) Problem 
Although South Africa is in good company regarding institutional exceptions,294 an ef-
fective FOI-law should generally  
‘cover all bodies that receive public money, including all branches of government […]. It would 
also open up to public scrutiny any “body” that carries out a function vital to the public interest 
(for example, private hospitals, schools, prisons), regardless of whether it receives government 
funding.’295
Government should be prevented from the use of secret law and governmental in-
formation should be managed in order to foster development and bring transparency 
into governmental conduct.296 Therefore, FOI-legislation should not only cover access 
to ‘information about government but also access to any information held by government.’297  
                                                 
292  See s 90 (2) PAIA). 
293  McKinley (note 12) at 6, 33. 
294  For instance Australia, Canada, Sweden, the UK and the USA know institutional exceptions, see 
Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 99 f; Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 4.17 [footnote 
39]. 
295  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 97. 
296  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 53. 
297  Johannessen/Klaaren/White (note 16) at 48, emphasis added. 
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Section 12 PAIA is problematic because it removes whole areas of strong public in-
terest from the public eye.298 In the historical context, it is especially worrisome that the 
provision makes no difference between pre- and post-1994 records, which impedes on 
coming to terms with the Apartheid era.299 Moreover, s 12 is not subject to the public 
interest override because s 46 PAIA only applies to the grounds of refusal in chapter 4. 
This is irritating since it makes no difference for requesters if they cannot rely on PAIA 
because of a general limitation of the application (s 12) or because of grounds of refusal 
(ss 33 ff, 66 ff). In addition, general limitations of the scope are even worse for request-
ers because while they can appeal against non-disclosure relying on grounds of refusal 
using the act’s instruments, this is not possible if PAIA is not applicable. It is ‘unfair’ in 
a sense, that Cabinet is not simultaneously excluded from the definition of ‘requester’.300 
This ‘one way track’ informational flow in favour of Cabinet contradicts PAIA’s pur-
pose because the act’s purpose is to subject public bodies to public scrutiny not to empower 
them to retrieve information.301
(2) Justification 
The institutional exceptions must be justified in terms of s 36. Their common purpose 
is that the state’s institutions must be able to function efficiently. Limiting the right ac-
cording to the type of public body instead of the class of information sought constitutes 
a broad exception. Broad exceptions can only be justified if they reflect the complexity 
of certain problems.302  
The exception of judicial records is justified in light of the protection of the efficient 
functioning of the courts, the fairness of litigation and the finality of judicial deci-
sions.303 Less restrictive means are not apparent. Despite of their institutional character, 
the limitation appears to be reasonably balanced: neither records relating to administra-
tive functions of courts,304 nor records that are not in sole control or possession of the 
court are exempted.305 The remaining records are those that emanate from litigation. 
The persons affected (mainly the litigants themselves and third parties that intervene) 
have a right to access those records via the rules of discovery.  
                                                 
298  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 100. 
299  McKinley (note 12) at 33 f. 
300  Section 2 (2) PAIA. 
301  See the Preamble of PAIA. 
302  O’Brien (note 6) at 52 names ‘national security’ and ‘criminal law enforcement’ as examples. 
303  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 4.18. 
304  Nevertheless it will be difficult to draw a line between administrative and judicial functions. 
305  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 4.18. 
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The exemption of records in the sole possession of members of Parliament is justified 
in light of the protection of freedom of speech and political activity in the legislatures.306 
Concerns are alleviated because of the general publicity of Parliament: Records that 
emanate from the legislative process like bills, statutes, regulations and so on are fully 
accessible. Furthermore, the public must be involved and has access to the National 
Assembly and its Committees, s 59 (1). Although that access can be limited again 
(ss 59 (1) (b) (i) and 59 (2)) it cannot be refused fully so there is still enough public scru-
tiny and participation possible. 
 It is questionable if the categorical exclusion of Cabinet’s records via s 12 can be justi-
fied. Some arguments militate in favour of the limitation: It is infused by notions like 
‘the convention of collective ministerial responsibility’ and the ‘fiction of cabinet 
unanimosity’ from Westminster constitutionalism. Although hard to impart in the days 
of public crucifixion of ministers, the Constitution explicitly retains these principles.307 
Furthermore, Cabinet members may enjoy privileges prescribed by national legislation, 
s 58 (2). Additionally, the limitation’s scope is lessened by Cabinet’s duty to provide 
Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control, 
s 92 (3) (b) as such reports are subject to PAIA. Therefore, some note that the limitation 
is constitutional as long as it is interpreted extremely narrow:308 They argue, that it 
would not apply to records which are not in the sole possession or control of Cabinet.309 
It seems doubtful if such a narrow interpretation alone can save the exception. First of 
all, PAIA’s exceptions are listed exhaustively and generally must be interpreted narrowly 
so the narrow interpretation-argument is not very persuasive. Second, narrow interpreta-
tion does still not encompass ‘true’ records of Cabinet. It merely re-encompasses re-
cords that have been held by other bodies while the very core of Cabinet decisions and 
politics are likely to be records in the sole possession of Cabinet. Furthermore, privi-
leges like s 58 (2) still must comply with the Bill of Rights. There are further arguments 
speaking against the exception’s justification: Historically, the exception does not comply 
with Constitutional Principle IX which explicitly demands access to information at ‘all 
levels’ of ‘government’. The Principle’s wording makes clear that at least some access to re-
cords of the Cabinet must be provided. This demand is not sufficiently met by the right 
                                                 
306  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 4.19. 
307  See s 92 (2) 
308  Davis (note 31) at 26-12; Rautenbach (note 80) at 1A78.2. 
309  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 4.16 state that requests can be directed to bodies that prepared and 
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to access parliament’s records because ‘parliament’ encompasses both, ‘government’ and 
‘opposition’ so it does not apply to the more specific rules regarding ‘Cabinet’. Regard-
ing the nature of the right, s 36 (1) (a), one has to bear in mind the importance of access 
to information particularly in terms of political participation. Cabinet is the central body 
of the government and together with the President is head of the executive, s 85 (2). 
Cabinet has strong influence on the legislation because it dominates the ruling majority 
of parliament.310 McKinley notes that ‘[h]uman rights […] cannot be exercised fully when 
access to the key decisions and processes that provide the foundation for both legisla-
tion and administrative action by government is denied.’311  
Of course the importance of Cabinet also bears on the nature, extent and purpose 
of the limitation, s 39 (1) (c) and (d). Without a well functioning Cabinet democracy 
does not work and the state literally becomes ‘ungovernable’. The limitation’s purpose is 
to make sure that Cabinet can fulfil its executive functions as assigned by the Constitu-
tion. The executive must be able to make decisions, especially if they are hard to make 
or unpopular. Fear and pressure coming from public scrutiny could make that decision-
making impossible ex ante. The democratic duty to be accountable for political decisions 
can be fulfilled ex post.  
The protection of Cabinet’s functions is strongly linked to the protection of its delibera-
tive process.312 The problem is that this purpose can be achieved with less restrictive 
means, s 36 (1) (e). The standard of ‘less restrictive means’ is not one of unattainable 
norm of perfection, but reasonableness.313 One cannot viably argue that the exemption 
is necessary. That argument is not very convincing because the provincial equivalents of 
Cabinet (the Executive Councils of the Provinces, ‘ECP’) are not encompassed by the 
exemption despite they perform similar functions and enjoy the same importance, but 
only on a different level of government. One might argue that this difference is justified 
because Cabinet is acting on a ‘higher level ov governance’ than the ECPs, therefore is 
‘more important’ and in need of more protection from disclosure. Nevertheless, the 
limitation is ‘overbroad’ because it exempts records that can be disclosed without leav-
ing Cabinet’s functions in jeopardy.314 This can be said without ‘unduly narrowing the 
                                                 
310  See White (note 26) at 73. 
311  McKinley (note 12) at 7. 
312  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 4.16. 
313  S v Mamabolo (E TV and Others Intervening) 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC) at 49. 
314  Compare Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others; Curtis v Minister of Safety and 
Security and Others 1996 (5) BCLR 609 (CC) at 48 ff; Coetzee v Government of the Republic of South Af-
 32
 
range of policy choices’.315 There is a means that must be chosen because it is not only 
less restrictive, but at the same time also not less effective:316 The deliberative process of 
Cabinet (if it was within the act’s ambit) would be explicitly guarded by s 44 PAIA.317 
Cabinet’s deliberations can be sufficiently protected on a case-by-case basis, because 
s 44 is worded broadly318 and partially319 is not even restricted by any kind of necessity 
of harm-test.320 Such a case-by-case protection would not impose significant administra-
tive burdens on the state as Cabinet could deal with requests.321 The effectiveness of the 
protection of sensitive records would depend on the skills of the IO appointed by Cabi-
net, who could use s 44 together with the above mentioned arguments which kind of 
create an assumption speaking for non-disclosure.  
It is generally less harsh to make use of a ground of refusal than limiting the scope 
of PAIA right away: In the former case, the exception can be overturned by public in-
terest322 and PAIA can be used for an appeal against the non-disclosure decision while 
in the latter, the act is not applicable so there is no chance for public scrutiny from the 
start. 
This leads to the conclusion that the categorical exception of Cabinet’s records is 
inconsistent with the limitation clause. Section 12 of PAIA is unconstitutional because it 
does not ‘give effect’ to the right of access to information insofar as Cabinet’s records 
are concerned. This ‘failure to regulate cabinet records’ causes direct application of s 32 
of the Constitution, unmediated by PAIA.323
cc) Protection of International Relationships 
According to s 41 (1) (a) (iii) PAIA, an information officer may refuse disclosure if it 
could reasonably be expected to cause prejudice to the international relations of South 
Africa. As only information officers will know the content of the requested record, it is 
                                                                                                                                          
rica; Matiso & Others v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) at 13, 
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317  Section 44 PAIA. 
318  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 8.98 f submit that it is drafted wider than any of its models. 
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only them who can assess the likelihood of harm and determine the scope of the limita-
tion, which is a problematical situation.324 The provision also has the potential to insu-
late intergovernmental organisations completely from disclosure as any information they 
hold will typically affect international relations.325
When considering the purpose of the limitation, one must keep in mind that inter-
national relations are a very sensitive field. Furthermore, the exception is alleviated in 
two ways: it is partly subject to a necessity of harm-clause as disclosure must reasonably 
be expected to ‘cause prejudice’.326 Additionally, s 44 (a) (iii) is weakened by subsection 
(3) which leads to mandatory disclosure 20 years after the record came into existence. 
Therefore, while the ‘immediate’ handling of international relationships can be kept in 
camera, every record eventually becomes subject to public scrutiny. These mitigating 
factors leave the exception justified against the constitutional background of s 36. 
dd) Integrated ‘Necessity of Harm’-Clauses 
The drafted proposal of PAIA suggested a ‘necessity of harm’-clause included with 
every limitation. To refuse access, such a clause requires the information officer to 
prove reasonably expected harm if access would be granted.327 Such condition is needed 
to keep exceptions from turning out to be very broad,328 and is believed to be a general 
principle of access to information legislation.329 Although the South African govern-
ment proclaimed that ‘[i]nformation will be available unless there is a good reason to 
withhold it’,330 the ‘necessity of harm’-clause has been axed from the draft. This deletion 
significantly shifted the balance between the principle (access) and the exemption (re-
fusal) towards intransparency.331
Nevertheless, ‘necessity of harm’-clauses have found their way into most provisions 
of the act in a more integrated style.332 The consequences of disclosure are all subject to 
an objective test and require more than an individual opinion, suspicion or speculation 
about the harmful consequence; therefore, they all are subject to review.333 While some 
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grounds of refusal are solely based on a categorical approach without the need to prove the 
consequence of ‘likelihood of harm’,334 this does not seem critical as the disclosure of 
some types of information typically bear the danger of harm. Particularly information that 
is primarily of great economic value will usually trigger competition when shared, and 
while competition certainly is good for the consumer, it equates to harm for the now-
competitor and former information-monopolist. Therefore, the way PAIA deals with 
necessity of harm is considered constitutional. 
ee) Public Interest Override 
PAIA’s public interest override is limited to information which discloses evidence of a 
breach of law or a serious risk to public safety or the environment.335 This bears the 
advantage of being clear but is also narrow in its scope.336 It especially must be criticised 
that the institutional exemptions337 are not subject to any public interest override.338  
The narrow scope of the override however is justified as the override is only applied 
when a ground of refusal applies, which again must be interpreted narrowly. Thus, the 
override is meant to operate as a ‘last safety valve’. As such, it needs to be narrowly de-
fined. Although the expenditure of the clause to all grounds of refusal would be favour-
able because it would facilitate access,339 it is not constitutionally indicated. 
b) Criticising PAIA’s Procedure 
In addition to the concerns related to its scope and limitations, the PAIA must also be 
criticised for its procedure. 
aa) Interpretation 
It is doubtful that s 2 (1) PAIA merely provides courts to interpret the act according to its 
objects while the definition of ‘court’ in s 1 leaves out the bodies that decide the internal 
appeal.340  
The Constitutional Court made clear that whenever the legislature enacts legislation ‘to 
meet its constitutional obligations and does so within constitutional limits, courts must 
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give full effect to the legislative purpose.’341 This demand must a minore be true for the 
internal appeal bodies as they exercise a court-like function. To the requester it does not 
matter which institution or person is ruling over his appeal. There is no apparent reason 
why the requester should enjoy less intense protection on the first level of remedies. On 
the contrary, there is a strong incentive to settle disputes at the first stage as courts are 
overburdened. 
Nevertheless, s 2 (1) of PAIA is not unconstitutional. It may be interpreted widely 
to allow it to encompass agencies that are exercising their adjudicational duties as set out 
by PAIA. Despite the clear wording of the definitions in s 1 this can be done according 
to the principle of argumentum a maiore ad minus. If courts are obliged to interpret the act  
to be disclosure friendly, agencies exercising an adjudicational function are a fortiori 
obliged to do so. 
bb) Deemed Refusal 
Criticism is directed at the act’s ‘deemed refusal’-provisions.342 By these, PAIA allows infor-
mation holders the option of simply ignoring ‘unpopular’ requests.343 The proposed 
change of the provision into a ‘deemed approval’344 would certainly be very requester-
friendly and would help motivate to speed up the process. On the other hand, it would 
very likely be incapable of dealing with at least some agency’s realities, thus producing 
huge backlogs. A system where backlogs leave requesters without any decision to appeal 
against is even worse, so the actual mechanism appears to be the lesser of two evils. 
Ultimately, the nature of the right and of the limitation justify ss 27 and 58.  
cc) Fees 
With regards to PAIA’s fee-system, some claim that fees generally are too high and that 
some even have a prohibitive character.345 It has also been critically remarked that the 
minister - despite explicitly empowered346 - has made no effort whatsoever to alleviate 
the financial burden on poor requesters.347  
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Section 32 (2) of the Constitution allows to alleviate the financial burden on the 
state. Thus, the limitation of access to information by imposing fees is constitutionally 
justifiable.348 Nevertheless, measures to keep agencies functional must be ‘reasonable’.  
The ratio of s 32 (2) is that in a social-democratic constitution ‘a balance needs to be 
struck between the recognition and promotion of the rights of each individual and the 
financial constraints within which the state must function.’349 On the one hand, process-
ing requests is costly, so one might consider a right of access to information a flight of 
fancy regarding the overall developmental needs of South Africa. Within developmental 
countries collected fees can even facilitate access as they can be used to enhance the 
agency’s answering capacity.350 On the other hand, the statement of Ackermann that the 
‘amount of fees charged is crucial for determining the real level of accessibility of infor-
mation’351 is even more true for developing countries. If fees are not carefully balanced 
they are likely to exclude large parts of the population. It is commonly noted that the 
fees must not be too high as to deter requests.352 Some submit that the fee schedule 
cannot be designed on a cost-recovery basis as this would deter all but a handful of re-
quests.353 This notion is evidenced by the wording ‘to alleviate’ which means to ‘make a 
difficulty […] less severe’ but not to get rid of a difficulty at all.354
It is difficult to determine when a fee is too high to still be constitutional, but it 
seems unfair to calculate fees on the basis of costs instead of the status of requesters. 
The primary statement of s 32 is to establish a right; the fact that the provision allows 
for alleviation of the financial burden is an annex to that right. The established fees 
must not be of a character that reverses this correlation, thus leading to a system where 
one has to be able to ‘afford’ one’s right of access to information. Certainly a system of 
flexible fees that responds to the requesters’ financial capabilities would be easier to 
justify than the current rigid fees. Again it seems difficult to account for the enormous 
gap between rich and poor in South Africa. One would have to differ between ‘rich’ and 
‘poor’ requesters to be capable of subsidising the latter with part of the fees collected 
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from the former. Determining the financial capabilities of a requester would raise addi-
tional procedural efforts and prolong the already excessive time frame.355 A more effi-
cient way would be to allow requesters to apply for financial aid in case they need it. 
This way requesters could decide if they want to take the risk of prolonged procedures 
on a case-to-case basis. 
Such a requester-dependent fee system forms a less restrictive means to achieve the 
goal of keeping agencies functional as it is capable of the same alleviation while deter-
ring less requesters. Therefore, the current system is difficult to justify in terms of 
s 36 (1) (e). Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that one is dealing with a legisla-
tive omission. According to ss 22 (8) and 92 (1) (b), regulations have to be made in con-
sultation with the minister of finance and must be passed through Parliament. The time 
needed for that must be granted. Furthermore, the act itself does not provide for a ter-
minal system of fees as it heavily relies on regulations in this regard. Therefore, the act is 
not unconstitutional in terms of its fees. 
dd) Access in the Context of Litigation 
Access to information in the context of litigation is a very controversial issue. It has 
been brought forth that the ‘nature of litigation’ itself forms a valid reason contra pre-
litigational discovery of information. This argument has to be rejected firmly. There is 
no such thing as an ‘element of surprise’ in litigation that is capable of forming a justifi-
able restraint to access information. In civil proceedings, this notion has been aban-
doned for the reason that ‘justice was better served when the element of surprise was 
eliminated from the trial and the parties were prepared to address issues on the basis of 
complete information of the case to be met.’356 To negate this would equal negating the 
proceedings’ efficiency as a desirable goal. 
As soon as information is taken into a courtroom it becomes public anyway because 
courtrooms are public venues by definition.357 The main question is how one can dis-
cover information prior to any litigation, mainly to assess the litigation’s chance of suc-
cess. The common law of both USA and Australia denies prelitigational access to in-
formation.358 In South Africa, the matter had been discussed early as the question 
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already arose regarding the Interim Constitution.359 Most of the early judgements have 
been ruled in the context of access to police dockets.360 One must bear in mind that an 
accused person enjoys special rights when applying those cases to the general question 
of access to information for litigation. The South African High Court ruled that infor-
mation contained in a police docket that is needed for another civil action has to be 
disclosed to enable the litigant to assess his chances.361 On the other hand, it refused to 
rule pro disclosure regarding criminal trials as long as investigations are not com-
pleted.362 The court also refused to grant blanket privileges to whole dockets; it stated 
that one has to distinguish between privileged (which must not be disclosed) and unprivi-
leged information (which has to be disclosed) even if that is within one file;363 a ruling 
that matches PAIA’s severability clause. 
(1) Aligning PAIA with Rule 35 of the High Court 
A central issue of pre-litigational discovery is the relationship between the rules of dis-
covery and access to information legislation.364 The scope of s 32 of the Constitution 
and PAIA on the one side and the scope of rule 35 of the High Court on the other side 
have to be balanced. There is no threshold beneath which requests can be considered 
‘informal’ and do not fall within the scope of s 7.365 Generally, the PAIA governs re-
quests of any type. There is no distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ requests be-
cause this would directly contravene the objects of PAIA as set out in s 9. Furthermore, 
it remains completely unclear where one would have to draw the line making that dis-
tinction; certainly the form of the request cannot serve that purpose as s 18 (3) PAIA 
even stipulates oral requests to be sufficient when justified. Nevertheless, if the two 
spheres are not separated properly there is the danger that deciding discovery related 
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matters via FOI-legislation might lead to crippling delays in administrative procedures 
while the courts review the agency’s records.366
The relationship between rule 35 and PAIA is determined by s 7 PAIA which stipu-
lates that access to information via PAIA cannot be sought if 
(a)  that record is requested for the purpose of criminal or civil proceedings; 
(b)  so requested after the commencement of such criminal or civil proceedings, as the case 
may be; and 
(c)  the production of or access to that record for the purpose referred to in paragraph (a) is 
provided for in any other law.  
Section 7 (a) - (c) are clearly worded as additional conditions.367 The section grants 
priority to specific provisions (like rule 35) which are embedded into court proceedings. 
Considering pre-litigational situations rule 35 is not interfering with the concept of access 
to information via PAIA. Discovery via rule 35 is only possible from the moment litiga-
tion commenced. Judge Cameron J noted that ‘[o]nce court proceedings between the 
parties have commenced the rules of discovery take over’. This, however, does not ex-
actly meet the provision’s purpose and wording. If information is sought for litigational 
purposes and proceedings have already commenced, s 7 (c) makes clear that a request 
via PAIA is still possible as a subsidiary means as long as other laws do not ‘provide’ for 
access.368 The term ‘provide’ can be construed twofold: Either narrowly in a sense that 
as soon as any law is generally providing for litigational access to information PAIA is not 
applicable, or in a wide sense that if the specific requester cannot successfully rely on any 
other law for any reason they can still successfully lodge a request using PAIA. The lat-
ter interpretation suits the value assigned to the right of access to information better. 
Nevertheless that interpretation is quite broad. There are situations imaginable where 
requesters should not be allowed to rely on PAIA anymore, for instance, if they waived 
the right or would have had the possibility to rely on other provisions but didn’t do so 
for their own fault. Except for such extreme cases PAIA must be available as subsidiary 
means. The purpose of s 7 as interpreted here is to establish a ‘safety net’ which con-
tributes to fair proceedings.369 Therefore, the argument that information cannot be 
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sought under s 32 if it can be obtained later by the rules of discovery has rightfully been 
rejected by the High Courts.370 The Constitutional Court has left this question open.371 
In some cases courts ruled that the litigant may seek information relying on s 32 addi-
tionally to the right of discovery set out in Rule 35.372 This approach suits s 7 PAIA as it 
is construed here. However, other judgements have objected this notion.373
The main objection against pre-litigational disclosure based on the right of access to 
information has been that it would call for ‘fishing expeditions’.374 Such expeditions are 
undesirable because they are designed to find something that would initiate proceedings 
which otherwise would have never commenced. The underpinning notion of prelitiga-
tional discovery is to be able to verify a specific claim that becomes apparent but not to 
dig out possible claims which one would not have noticed otherwise. A pre-litigational 
‘fishing expedition’ could have the potential to force persons to give the initial reason 
for a proceeding against them. Judge Davis J noted: 
‘I have serious doubts as to whether s 32 should be used to justify a principle of discovery before 
the time provided in Rule 35(1) of the High Court Rules. It would mean that a defendant who 
falls within the scope of s 32 must lay bare its entire case before any action is in fact 
launched.’375
The argument of Davis J was rejected by Van Dijkhorst who rendered it invalid in 
case the requester has a prima facie claim which needs to be bolstered by the information 
sought.376 One may argue that a potential defendant could be obliged to expose facts 
which the potential plaintiff would have to prove in case of an actual proceeding and 
therefore be given an unfair advantage over the future defendant. However, this is a 
matter of the onus of proof in the first place. The order does not depend on whether 
the requested person refuses to give information (or gives wrong or fragmentary infor-
mation) prior to the litigation (via PAIA) or during the litigation (via the rules of discov-
ery). If the facts are uncertain or improvable the judgement will depend on the onus in 
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both cases - no matter when access is granted. Currie/Klaaren note that as far as public 
records are concerned ‘fishing expeditions’ are unlikely anyway.377 This is questionable 
as the state increasingly engages in commercial activity and therefore could be targeted 
by competitors as well. On the bottom line the potential defendant’s privacy, commer-
cial secrets and various other issues are guarded by PAIA itself, on the one hand by its 
exemptions (which mostly serve both public and private bodies)378 and on the other 
hand by the qualification to comply with379 when requesting privately held informa-
tion.380 These prerequisites to disclosure help to prevent a potential defendant from 
being obliged to ‘lay bare its entire case’ as feared by Judge Davis J.  
Meanwhile one has to yield the merits of pre-litigational discovery: It enables pre-
litigational conflict resolution through evaluation of facts. Either the information sought 
is supplementing the plaintiff and therefore suitable to facilitate the proceedings; or it is 
not which then helps to prevent litigation. A well-informed requester will not litigate on 
shaky grounds. Judge Traverso points out that the applicant is  
‘entitled to all such information as may be reasonably required by it to establish whether or not 
its right […] has been violated. The applicant will reasonably require this information to 
make an informed decision on the future conduct of the matter. If it is shown that the tenders 
were properly considered, the applicant can abandon any proposed application for a review of 
the decision. If not, the information will enable the applicant to properly formulate the 
grounds.’381
This is a main reason why Cameron JA substantially differed from his colleagues’ 
judgement in Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk. He stated that 
‘Litigation involves massive costs, time, personnel, effort and risks. Where access to a document 
can assist in avoiding the initiation of litigation, or opposition to it, the objects of the statute 
suggest that access should be granted.’382
The pre-litigational use of PAIA can help to facilitate procedure’s efficiency as well 
as to relieve court dockets. This of course only works out as long as the request does 
not protract litigation. If the latter is likely, it is better to rely on the rules of discovery.383
Courts did not hesitate to attach importance to proceedings’ economy: In Chairper-
son: Standing Tender Committee and others v JFE Sapela Electronics (Pty) Ltd and others, the ap-
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pellants had at first instance refused to furnish the respondents with the necessary in-
formation and documentation of a tendering process although it had been requested via 
PAIA. According to Judge Scott JA, this forced the respondents to take the risk of 
launching proceedings without even being able to substantiate their grounds of review. 
He clearly regarded this behaviour as a delay tactic and the Judge explicitly made the 
appellants face the music for causing such a delay: Although successful in their appeal, 
the appellants were ordered to bear the respondents’ costs of all instances.384
Against that precedent and while simultaneously opposing the justification of ‘fish-
ing expeditions’, Judge Cameron JA argued that access had to be granted if the plaintiff 
has 
established a clear and substantial connection between […] claim […] and the contents of the 
[information sought].385
and further concluded that  
[PAIA] affords an opportunity to broaden the approach to pre-action access. It does so on a 
basis that is flexible and accommodating without threatening […] boundless exposure […]. 
The key lies in a case-by-case application of whether a litigant “requires” a record. […][I]t is 
a legitimate and beneficial approach to the statute to apply it so that where a record will assist 
a party in evaluating a potential claim this will count as advantage or need for statutory pur-
poses.386
This broad approach to pre-litigational use of PAIA has quite recently been ap-
proved, but at the same time also has been restrained by Judge Brand JA who took the 
position that 
[…] reliance on s 50 is [not] automatically precluded merely because the information sought 
would eventually become accessible under the rules of discovery, after proceedings have been 
launched. What I do say is that pre-action discovery under s 50 must remain the exception 
rather than the rule; that it must only be available to a requester who has shown the “element 
of need” or ‘substantial advantage” of access to the requested information […].387
Judge Brand JA further considered the use of PAIA as legitimate to ‘identify the 
right defendant’ but not to obtain ‘all information which will assist in evaluating one’s 
prospects of success against the only potential defendant’.388 At the same time Brand JA 
leaves it unclear which types of information should be discoverable via PAIA and which 
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388  Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk (note 160) at para 22, emphasis added. 
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should not. This is not plausible: First, to sue the ‘right’ defendant is as essential for 
successful litigation as various other prerequisites are. Plaintiffs do not care why they 
will lose a case; to somebody who claims a right every single prerequisite to a winning 
order is of the same importance. There is no way to make plaintiffs understand that they 
are entitled to use PAIA to identify the right defendant but not to find out, for instance, 
if a known defendant can rely on benefits or defences that would render the claim and 
the action obsolete or unviable, eg because the defendant is insolvent. On the other side 
of the coin, to the defendants it makes no difference why they are not being sued suc-
cessfully – as long they win. Additionally, Brand JA’s notion contradicts the abovemen-
tioned pre-litigational conflict resolution capacity of PAIA. Another argument against a 
narrow interpretation of s 7 PAIA is that the provision is determining the overall scope 
of PAIA. To interpret it narrowly means to generally withhold a wide range of applica-
tion without offering any counter-exception. Such a narrow interpretation contravenes 
the principle of maximum disclosure and appears to be disproportionate and unneces-
sary in terms of the limitation clause. Justified interests of requested bodies can still be 
protected by use of PAIA’s exemptions. Therefore, there is no need for such broad 
general restraint. 
It has to be mentioned though that the matter is often likely to be a sham fight: It 
has been stated that  
[t]he rules of […] discovery and the aims of [PAIA] will mostly not be at odds, and much of 
what is subject to disclosure under the act would also be subject to disclosure for litigational 
purposes.389
Ultimately, it can be said that access to information prior to certain litigation has 
been acknowledged, thus in a narrow context: Pre-trial discovery by means of PAIA 
should remain the exception rather than the rule. It is restricted to requesters who can 
show an element of need or substantial advantage. Those cases significantly differ from a pure 
‘fishing expedition’ insofar as the applicants sought information in regard to one specific 
proceeding and not just in general to find out if there might be any reason for proceeding. 
Concerning privately held information, this approach matches s 50 (1) (a) PAIA which 
demands that the record is required for the exercise or protection of any rights; it is part 
of that qualification that the applicant proves ‘what the right is that he wishes to exercise 
or protect, what the information is which is required and how that information will as-
                                                 
389  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at.15. 
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sist him in exercising or protecting that right’.390 There is an assumption that the request 
is not a ‘fishing expedition’ if a requester gives detailed and unanswered reasons for be-
lieving in a right’s violation.391 The requester of privately held information has to show a 
right-information-relation, a condition that can and should be interpreted in a way that ren-
ders ‘fishing expeditions’ impossible. 
However, a qualification is not a premise for the disclosure of information held by 
public bodies.392 Because of the clear wording of s 32 (1) (a) of the Constitution such a 
qualification cannot be read into s 11 PAIA either. Therefore, no such qualification can 
be used to prevent ‘fishing expeditions’. The body ought not to be concerned at all with 
the fact of whether litigation is intended because requesters for public records are not 
obliged to furnish any reasons for the request. This of course makes the application of 
s 7 (1) PAIA difficult if not impossible for public bodies as they have no chance to de-
termine the request’s background;393 however, this is intended. The valuation of s 32 (1) 
of the Constitution and of PAIA is clear: The state has been imposed with a greater 
burden than private bodies to endure and grant information requests. Notwithstanding, 
‘fishing expeditions’ for public records are unwanted as well. Public bodies don’t have to 
tolerate abuse of PAIA. The act itself provides measures to deal with such requests 
without infringement of s 32 (1) of the constitution: The information officer can rely on 
s 45 (a) PAIA394 to refuse disclosure because an obvious ‘fishing expedition’ can be re-
garded as either ‘vexatious’, ‘frivolous’ or both. The onus in this matter is on the body 
that is relying on s 45 PAIA. As a public body’s information officer cannot exact any 
‘need to know’ by the requester (s 11 (3)) the former will only be able to turn down sus-
pected ‘fishing expedition’-requests in obvious cases.395 This outcome might be subject 
to criticism as well but one has to bear in mind that the (unqualified!) right to access 
publicly held information is the rule, not the exception. Levine is on point when he notes 
                                                 
390  Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC and Others (note 172) at para 
28; also see Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk (note 160) at para 6. 
391  Christie (note 374) at 3H36. 
392  See section 11 PAIA. 
393  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at.15. 
394  Section 45 PAIA reads  
‘The information officer of a public body may refuse a request for access to a record of the body 
if— 
(a) the request is manifestly frivolous or vexatious; or 
(b) the work involved in processing the request would substantially and unreasonably divert the 
resources of the public body.’ 
395  Regarding the problems to reconcile section 11 (3) with section 45 see Currie/Klaaren (note 13) 
at 8.108 f. 
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that ‘[i]nvolvement in litigation does not harm a person’s right of access to information 
[…]’ under freedom of information legislation.396  
Requests via PAIA on litigational purposes should be launched well in advance as it 
will be difficult to interrupt a proceeding and wait for the result of the request as soon 
as litigation has commenced.397
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(2) Response Times and Matters of Urgency 
The most dreadful problem is PAIA’s long response times. There is no possibility of 
achieving disclosure in time for urgent matters. 
                                                 
396  Levine (note 364) at 45. 
397  Levine (note 364) at 48. 
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(aa) PAIA’s Time Frame 
The possible delay of requests is illustrated below: 
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Time periods granted in favour of the requester are highlighted in grey. Although 
the purpose of those periods is to assist requesters by granting them enough time to 
lodge an appeal, periods still have to be taken into account fully as it is the requesters’ 
right to exhaust them. PAIA therefore allows a delay of up to 180 days when requesting 
publicly held information and up to 120 days when requesting privately held informa-
tion. That is merely the time needed to exhaust the procedure and enter into court litiga-
tion which thereupon takes an unpredictable amount of additional time. PAIA’s proce-
dure does not provide for any acceleration in case of an urgent application.398 One 
positive note is that PAIA restricts the right to appeal against the internal appeal deci-
sion to the requester and third parties,399 so disclosure cannot be delayed or prevented 
by an appeal of the requested body. 
 
 
                                                 
398  Further see C.V.2.b)dd)(2). 
399  Section 78 PAIA. 
 47
 
(bb) The Importance of Time  
While it is probably impossible to determine a specific ‘average period’ that indicates 
unconstitutionality it is common sense that only timely access to information is effective 
access to information: There are only few occasions to think of where access is not seri-
ously time sensitive, for example, if a request is made out of pure curiosity. As soon as 
one is confronted with the need to decide in a certain matter, the available information 
determines the choices of action. Whenever a decision is time sensitive, the request for 
additional information automatically becomes time sensitive because information gained 
after the decision is worthless. This may be illustrated by an example from the field of 
public procurement: when a company tenders for public services it has to gain as much 
information as possible about its competitors, the service itself, unavoidable costs and 
expectable profits etc. to be able to determine the lowest bid it can afford to make. By 
the time offers are due any additional information becomes worthless, no matter how 
valuable it would have been only one day earlier because there is no way to integrate the 
information into the company’s offer. This leads to the conclusion that access to infor-
mation is only effective if it happens in time. 
That is why especially in economical context the extent to which agencies can delay the 
disclosure of requested information is an important variable.400 Excessive delays in re-
sponding to a request are often tantamount to a denial.401 The very purpose of any ac-
cess to information Act can only be to deliver the requested information unless it is ex-
empt.402 International experience has been that an access to information-law is toothless 
as long as it does not install a fixed time frame and sanctions for non-compliance.403 Fur-
thermore, extensions need to be restricted to a fixed period of a reasonable duration404 
and must be treated as exceptional means.405 The provided timeframe has to show a 
balance between the requester’s right to receive information as rapidly as possible and 
the everyday demands of the requested body.406
                                                 
400  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 107. 
401  Sinrod (note 2) at 350 ff; Steinberg, Marc I ‘The 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act: The Safety Valve Provision § 552 (a) (6) (c) Excusing Agency Compliance with Statu-
tory Time Limits - a Proposed Interpretation’ (1976-1977) 52 Notre Dame Lawyer 235 at 235; 
Open Society Institute (note 68) at 35. 
402  Grunewald (note 2) at 347. 
403  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 118 f. 
404  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 16. 
405  Sinrod (note 2) at 333. 
406  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 174 f. 
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The delay of access to information is an issue of great concern - not only in South 
Africa.407 Backlog and delay of access to information requests on agency level are typical 
problems of freedom of information legislation. While the response periods worldwide 
differ between 24 hours and 3 calendar months,408 the global average is under 15 work-
ing days.409 The instituted time frame for extensions ranges from 5 working days to 30 
calendar days.410 South Africa falls well below the global average since it has one of the 
longest response periods. The initial response period as well as the extension time frame 
of PAIA is very agency friendly. Additionally there is no incentive to act quickly because 
the request is deemed refused if there is no decision given within that time.411  
The question is if PAIA’s generous time frame is constitutionally justified. Concern 
especially in developing countries has been that short response periods may overburden 
already weak bureaucracies and consequently lead to overburdened court dockets.412 
This argument is of little persuasion as it is often young transitional democracies that 
have successfully established effective and timely access to information.413 Regarding the 
16 top-performing public bodies, not one is situated in a mature democracy.414 Another 
argument is that there is no use for unrealistic timelines which are then frequently in-
fringed upon as this would undermine the respect for the whole act.415 The response 
period must be in conformity with agencies’ reality.416  
Other countries with FOI-legislation have been dealing with delay-problems for 
decades. Some ultimately prolonged the time frame but with little success.417 Prolonging 
of timeframes on agencies’ discretion has had no significant positive effect on their 
compliance.418 Instead, experience has been that shorter periods actually have the effect 
                                                 
407  See Grunewald (note 2) at 345; Steinberg (note 401) at 235 ff. 
408  See the comparison at Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 107; Open Society Institute 
(note 68) at 147. 
409  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 175. 
410  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 184. 
411  Section 27 PAIA (records of public bodies) and section 58 PAIA (records of private bodies). 
412  Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 107. 
413  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 69. For instance, the time frame for refusal in Chile is 48 
hours, in Spain (in environmental matters) three calendar months, see ibid., 147. Of course one 
has to take into account that the legal frame not necessarily reflects the actual practise. 
414  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 132. 
415  Mendel (note 7) at 31. 
416  The United States’ legislation therefore doubled the period from 10 to 20 days in 1974, Grune-
wald (note 2) at 350. 
417  The United States FOIA of 1966 was amended in 1974. Response time was doubled from 10 to 
20 days which however did not speed up the average request process, see Grunewald (note 2) at 
345; Steinberg (note 401) at ff. 
418  Sinrod (note 2) at 327 f. 
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of expediting agency response.419 Countries with short response periods generally per-
form better in granting access to information than those with longer periods420 because 
shorter periods encourage quicker release of information by sending out a clear signal to 
‘prioritize and respect the right to know’.421  
(cc) Ways to shorten Response Periods 
The most common explanation for delay concerns the limited resources combined with a 
large number and great volume or complexity of requests.422 Truly, it is essential to recognise 
that the availability of national resources limits the promotion and protection of rights, 
otherwise a realistic implementation is not possible.423 Nevertheless, delays are often 
provoked by man-made procedural flaws like the quality of information management424 
or the lack of clarity regarding legal exemptions,425 no matter if agencies are exercising 
‘due diligence’ in processing incoming requests.426
Usually some delay reduction can be achieved without the (re-) allocation of re-
sources.427 This notion is supported by a broad survey showing that institutions which 
complied with the right of access to information generally did so quickly and thor-
oughly; meanwhile, non-compliance was mainly connected to procedural flaws that lead 
to ‘mute refusals’ (deemed refusals).428 Therefore, access to information usually was 
either achieved timely - or not at all.429 In 2004 in South Africa only 14 per cent of all 
requests received any information430 in time, while 4 per cent were received late.431 This 
percentage is only about half of the worldwide average in compliance.432
                                                 
419  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 176. 
420  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 183 f. 
421  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 185. 
422  See e.g. Sinrod (note 2) at 326 f, 333 f; Steinberg (note 401) at 237 [referring to the American 
FBI]. 
423  Klaaren in HumRQ 2005, 553. 
424  McKinley (note 12) at 14 ff, 31 f regards this the main reason. 
425  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 184. 
426  The definition of ‘due diligence’ in this regard is somewhat difficult further see the discussion at 
Steinberg (note 401) at 244 ff. 
427  Grunewald (note 2) at 347 f. 
428  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 127. 
429  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 174 found that 43 per cent received information on time and 
50 per cent did not at all. Only 7 per cent of the requests have been answered, but late. 
430  This is including partial and inadequate information. 
431  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 179. 
432  The average in the 2006 survey was 26 per cent, see Open Society Institute (note 68) at 129. 
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It has been suggested that the establishment of multi track systems433 and prioritization 
is suitable for speeding up access to information.434 Furthermore, it has been recom-
mended to establish agency-specific procedures for agencies that are confronted with an 
exceptional amount of requests.435 The latter needs to be handled with care as it is likely 
to provoke inequalities and ambiguity; requesters need to be able to determine the ap-
plicable procedure solely by law; this is difficult enough considering PAIA’s complexity. 
Other means which could have a positive effect on reducing agencies’ response time 
include an effective reporting system which obliges agencies to show their performance 
(‘naming and shaming’ as an incentive).436 Meanwhile, the suggestion to allow those 
agencies that comply in time to collect a larger amount of fees437 must be rejected as this 
would disadvantage economically weak requesters. 
The most effective way to reduce systemic delays would be to ‘speed access by 
moving from a retail to a wholesale approach to information delivery.’438 Therefore, 
general publication of often requested material ought to be bolstered because this helps to 
satisfy requests in advance which otherwise would have been lodged individually.439 Ad-
ditionally, facilities that are serving access to information like public reading rooms and 
access tools need to be expanded. Another effective way to reduce time delays is to 
make use of electronic access to information, mainly via the internet and email.440 Digital 
requests remove physical and financial barriers of searching and reproducing informa-
tion; nevertheless, the use of this medium in developing countries is limited.441 Elec-
tronic access is no panacea as one has to bear in mind the so called ‘digital divide’ which 
describes the situation that large groups of the population are structurally incapable of 
gaining access to computer facilities.442 The procedures established must be accessible to 
the whole population because access to information is a fundamental right. If the inter-
net is intended to be used in a developing country, the government would have to pro-
vide public computing centres to meet that end.443 Otherwise, disadvantaged groups (as 
                                                 
433  For an assessment of the merits and demerits of this approach see C.V.2.b)dd)(2). 
434  Sinrod (note 2) at 356. 
435  Sinrod (note 2) at 357 f. 
436  Sinrod (note 2) at 360 f. 
437  Sinrod (note 2) at 361 ff. 
438  Grunewald (note 2) at; similar McKinley (note 12) at 28. 
439  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 10.2; Grunewald (note 2) at 366 f. 
440  Bovens (note 1) at 324; Sinrod (note 2) at 359 f. 
441  The internet penetration of South Africa only amounted up to 7.3 per cent in 2004, Open Soci-
ety Institute (note 68) at 143. 
442  Bovens (note 1) at 326; McKinley (note 12) at 28. 
443  As the government of Mexico has done, see Ackermann/Sandoval-Ballesteros (note 7) at 124 f. 
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they often exist in diverse countries like South Africa)444 will not be integrated but fur-
ther excluded. Besides organisational challenges one additionally has to keep in mind 
that ‘[w]hile posting materials on government websites clearly facilitates transparency, it 
is insufficient in itself to guarantee the right of access to information.’445 Likewise, it is 
not sufficient to refer to a general homepage but officials have to furnish a precise URL 
to promote easy access.446
(b) No Access via Urgent Proceedings 
While it is acknowledged that time is of the essence when litigation is pending,447 it can 
be even more vital prior to litigation. That is inter alia whenever a person seeks an (in-
termediate) interdict in advance to an uncertain near future event which might result in 
irreparable damage. If persons in that situation have to request information to be able to 
determine if the assumed claim or the feared danger is substantial, they cannot adhere to 
PAIA’s procedure because the response periods are ineligible for that purpose.448 The 
right to receive information in time is within the ambit of the right of access to informa-
tion449 because of the strong linkage between information and time.  
This right is significantly limited by ss 11 (1) (a) and 50 (1) (a) which stipulate that 
requesters, in order to receive a record, have to comply ‘with all the procedural require-
ments in this Act’ (records of public bodies),450 respectively ‘with the procedural re-
quirements in this Act’ (records of private bodies).451 It remains unclear if it makes a 
difference to comply with all or just with the procedural requirements; although the 
word ‘all’ usually emphasises the fact that no exclusion may be made, ‘the procedural 
requirements’ still encompasses all prerequisites. Therefore it appears as if ‘all’ is merely 
a surplus word. These provisions place the requester of urgently needed information in 
a serious dilemma: PAIA shows no means to expedite requests on agency level, no mat-
ter if the requester can prove urgency that is rendering priority handling obvious. Ac-
cording to the act every requester must stick with the procedure. The mere fact of ur-
                                                 
444  See Open Society Institute (note 68) at 164 f. 
445  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 142. 
446  Open Society Institute (note 68) at 142 f. 
447  Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Task Force 547 F.2d 605, 178 USAppDeC. 308 (DCCir 
1976) at 3. 
448  Concerning the procedurally foreseen time periods see the illustration at C.V.2.b)dd)(2)(aa). 
449  For the importance of the time factor see C.V.2.b)dd)(2)(bb). 
450  Section 11 (1) (a) PAIA emphasis added. 
451  Section 50 (1) (b) PAIA.  
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gency therefore automatically and unintentionally results in non-compliance with PAIA’s pro-
cedure - without any fault on the requester’s part. 
(aa) Reconciling PAIA with Urgent Matters via Interpretation? 
The question is if and how such a situation can be avoided.  
At the litigational stage, courts may grant ‘any order that is just and equitable, in-
cluding orders […] granting an interdict, interim or specific relief […]’.452 Thus one way 
to deal with matters of urgency would be to directly enter into litigation which would 
entitle the claimant to receive the information needed via the usual urgency court discovery 
proceedings. It would, however, simultaneously expose the now-litigant to a significant 
cost risk as the information obtained might show that an interdict cannot be granted. 
Furthermore such ‘blind’ litigation contributes to congestion of court dockets with un-
substantiated proceedings. To avoid these negative effects it is essential for litigants to 
gain access to the sought information prior to litigation453 – especially regarding matters 
of urgency. 
The fact that PAIA does not provide for an urgency procedure must be criticised. 
Access to information laws by there very nature must encompass a measure of urgency, 
even if it is just related to specific rights. Moreover, it is believed that requests regarding 
fundamental rights should generally be dealt with by way of urgent application.454  
It should be sufficient in such circumstances if the applicant tenders to comply with 
the procedural requirements. There is no reason why in urgent matters the applicant 
should not be allowed to comply with the procedural requirements afterwards. This 
seems suitable at least when considering conditions such as the identification of the 
correct information officer, the payment of fees, or the completion of forms. Regarding 
matters of urgency, the procedural requirements need to be narrowed down to the very 
basic, as it is the fact in other fields of law, too (for instance considering the rules of 
proof and evidence). One has to agree with Currie/Klaaren when they note that ‘[t]he 
principal purpose of [PAIA] is not served by placing formalistic barriers in the way of 
requesters.’455 Of course if applicants can’t comply they have no right to receive that 
                                                 
452  Section 82 (c) PAIA; the wording ‘including’ makes clear that the list is not exhaustive. 
453  See C.V.2.b)dd)(1). 
454  Mendel (note 7) at 32 pleads for a 48 hours request mechanism when the information is needed 
to safeguard life or liberty; also see White (note 26) at 75. 
455  Currie/Klaaren (note 13) at 5.4 f. 
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record. The damage done cannot be reversed once the information is proliferated. 
However, such damage still can be compensated for in terms of money. 
To insist on compliance with PAIA’s procedure in urgent matters means to funda-
mentally undermine the act’s purposes as well as the intent of s 32 of the constitution. 
As the preamble of PAIA states the latter has been enacted  
‘in order to foster a culture of transparency and accountability in public and private bodies by 
giving effect to the right of access to information;’ 
and to  
‘actively promote a society in which the people of South Africa have effective access to informa-
tion to enable them to more fully exercise and protect all of their rights.’ 
Moreover, the constitutional demand of s 32 (2) stating that ‘[n]ational legislation 
must be enacted to give effect to this right’456 is contravened. The act therefore does not only 
fail to facilitate ‘effective’ access to information but even turns into an instrument of 
restricting it by automatically preventing requesters from gaining any access in time re-
garding urgent matters.  
Section 39 (2) of the Constitution demands that such an interpretation must be 
avoided if possible. The question is if the interpretation of the act in matters of urgency 
can be aligned with the time that is at the applicant’s disposal. To reconcile PAIA with 
s 32 of the constitution, ss 11 (1) (a) and 50 (1) (b) would have to be interpreted in a way 
that ‘substantial compliance’ with the minimum requirements of s 18 is sufficient. Such 
approach is supported by s 19 which is imposing a strong duty on information officers 
to assist requesters. Furthermore it has been ruled that the pure reliance on technical 
grounds has been considered wrongful delay tactics.457
The problem is that the wording of ss 11 (1) (a) and 50 (1) (b) is definite. There is 
no room for an urgency-friendly interpretation in the provisions because they clearly 
state compliance with the complete procedure as a prerequisite. The wording of a provi-
sion necessarily constitutes the limit of its interpretation. Otherwise, uncertainty among 
the addressees of the provisions would arise. There is no indication within the act that 
would allow an interpretation of the provisions in a sense of ‘requesters must comply 
with this act’s provisions prior to disclosure unless they can show urgency.’ Further-
more, there is no provision that would coerce the respective information officer to grant 
                                                 
456  Emphasis added. 
457  MEC for Roads & Public Works v Intertrade Two (Pty) Ltd (note 365) at para 20. 
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the needed priority to urgent requests. Therefore, ss 11 (1) (a) and 50 (1) (b) cannot be 
reconciled with s 32 (1) of the constitution by means of interpretation. They infringe on 
requesters’ right to disclosure in time in matters of urgency as part of the right of access 
to information. 
(bb) Justification - Balancing Requesters’ Rights 
The question is if the lack of an urgent proceeding can be justified. It is hard to think of 
any purpose of such a limitation; in fact it appears more to be not intended at all. 
An imaginable reason for not establishing priority access on an agency level might be 
difficulties in how to balance the rights of all requesters. The expedition of one request neces-
sarily results in the delay of all other pending requests. The PAIA stipulates that there 
shall be sufficient personnel appointed to give effect to the right to access to informa-
tion,458 but personal and financial resources are limited and have to be allocated to and 
distributed between all requests. 
Generally a system that is processing requests on a chronological basis can be consid-
ered ‘fair’. But such ‘first-in, first-out’-system will usually lead to major backlogs. Within 
such system, matters of urgency would have to face great delay leading to the described 
situation that requesters would be completely deprived of their right of access insofar as 
late information is usually worthless. Furthermore, the processing of requests is not a 
matter of equality in the first place. Every requester has the right to receive the sought 
information within the statutory time limits. Therefore, every request must be viewed 
separately rather than in conjunction with all other requests. It cannot viably argue for 
the agency if it failed to give effective access numerous times before, which then lead to 
a backlog.459 Notwithstanding, if an agency is powerless in processing all requests timely 
- which the agency has to prove - it cannot be forced to do so. A pure chronological 
procedure is not always appropriate because there are reasons why certain requests need 
to be handled with priority.  
A less restrictive means to secure fair treatment of requesters and still enable agen-
cies to process requests in order could be achieved by granting priority to requests that 
are pending at the agency stage which also have been filed to court. Although the mere filing 
of a court action does not prove urgency, it is a priority-indicating factor of signifi-
                                                 
458  Section 17 (1) PAIA. 
459  Steinberg (note 401) at 235. 
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cance.460 On the other hand, this approach is likely to lead to a system where requesters 
who can afford triggering legal action to bolster their requests have more effective ac-
cess to information than those who cannot.461 Furthermore, it does not solve the prob-
lem of overburdened agencies and request backlogs but just protracts it to the court 
stage.462 Even if one assumes that agencies would ultimately improve simply to avoid 
that courts are handling all their requests,463 the filing of a court action as a method does 
not seem suitable for solving the problem. 
Another less restrictive means might be to establish multiple tracks. Requests would 
be categorized to expedite urgent requests but also to prevent small, simple requests 
from becoming stalled behind larger, more complex cases.464 Such a system does have 
disadvantages as well. Ironically experience has shown that multi track systems can be 
used in various ways to make access to information even more ineffective: Difficulties 
arise in how to draw the line between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ cases.465 Furthermore, the 
outcome strongly depends on how agencies are allocating their resources within the 
different tracks. Additionally, a ‘multiple track’-system will use more resources as any 
request has to be categorised and assigned to ‘its’ track first. Delay reduction also might 
be little to not gaugeable at agencies which handle requests decentralised and therefore 
process them concurrently. Requesters would depend on agencies’ expertise and good 
faith when it comes to the ‘track decision’ and these decisions would have a significant 
impact on the response time. At least a provisional notice of the decision would have to 
be given, maybe along with an opportunity for the requester to modify the request and 
make an assignment to a faster track possible. Of course this must be handled with care 
as it is the agencies that have oversight over its records, not the requester.466 The incen-
tive to speed up the request must not lead to a system where citizens are punished for 
making general requests as this is expressively allowed by the PAIA. Finally, in a multi 
                                                 
460  See the concurring opinion at Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Task Force (note 447); 
Levine (note 364) at 46 f; Steinberg (note 401) at 256. 
461  Grunewald (note 2) at 362; Steinberg (note 401) at 255 f. 
462  Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Task Force (note 447) at 3. 
463  One might agree with Grunewald (note 2) at, that finally such ‘learning by pain’ would benefit all 
requesters and this would make up the initial disadvantages. 
464  Sinrod (note 2) at 355. 
465  Sinrod (note 2) at 355 refers to the U.S.-American Mayock settlement which is defining inquiries 
requiring five days or fewer to process, seeking a limited number of documents, and involving 
minimal review for claims exemptions as ‘simple requests’ and inquiries requiring more than five 
days to locate, review, and prepare for disclosure, involving more than a limited number of 
documents, and requiring more than minimal review for claims exemptions as ‘complex re-
quests’. 
466  Grunewald (note 2) at 358 f. 
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track system it is likely that requesters who are dissatisfied with the agency’s discretion 
want to be ‘upgraded’ into a faster track. The tracking notice and the ‘negotiations’ re-
garding a track upgrade would provoke delays even before the agency has gone into 
medias res and as a result could make the situation even worse.467  
All of these disadvantages lead to the conclusion that a multi track-system might be 
less restrictive than having no urgency proceeding at all because it would impose signifi-
cant administrative burdens on the state. Even if a ‘multi track’-system in general is re-
jected and a ‘single track’-system is used, urgent requests need to be able to pass non-
urgent requests on a ‘fast track’468 - this is the very concept of proven urgency as it is 
recognised widely. True urgency is an exceptional situation that needs exceptional 
treatment. To simply ignore it is grossly disproportionate. An agency that does not grant 
priority to requesters showing urgency but instead sticks to a strict chronological ap-
proach cannot claim to execute ‘due diligence’ in handling its request workload.  
Of course the expedition of one request necessarily results in delaying all other re-
quests. The danger following from that (especially taking into account the deemed re-
fusal provisions) is that requests lodged to a much-requested public body have no 
chance of success as long as they are not filed as urgent matters and therefore enjoy 
preferential handling over all other requests. This could lead to the situation that every 
requester claims urgency to secure preferential treatment.  
To protect and enhance fairness, the requester must specify and prove an urgent need 
for the information as an additional condition.469 Agencies would only have to expedite 
the request in truly deserving situations to help prevent the most serious types of harm 
caused by delayed responses.470 This is open to criticism insofar as it is the very spirit of 
freedom of information legislation to grant access to public records without proving a 
‘need to know’.471 Nevertheless, the general concept of PAIA that no special interest has 
to be shown to gain access to publicly held information is not violated because the re-
quester does not merely seek any access but wants to be entitled to priority over others. 
Thus the expedition of urgent matters is not about preferring ‘substantial’ requests over 
those that only serve individual ‘curiosity’. Without any qualification as a prerequisite for 
                                                 
467  For the experience in the United States see Grunewald (note 2) at 349 ff. 
468  Steinberg (note 401) at 249. 
469  Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Task Force (note 447) at 2; Unitas Hospital v Van Wyk 
(note 160) at para 22. 
470  Sinrod (note 2) at 354. 
471  Steinberg (note 401) at 249. 
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expedition most certainly inequalities will arise and fair and equal treatment of all re-
quests will be difficult to maintain. Therefore, it is justifiable to invoke requesters’ ‘need 
to know’ if they are keen on expedition - even regarding publicly held information.  
This does not constitute an infringement on s 32 (1) (a) of the Constitution as the 
provision merely frees requesters from showing any need regarding general - but not expe-
dited - access to information. This approach has been opposed ‘because priority of ac-
cess is so interrelated to the right of access itself, it is illogical to permit inquiry into a 
person’s need to know in either circumstance.’472 While this is true in principal, it does 
not provide any help to deal with the realities. It implicates that there is no ‘better right 
of access’ - although the impact of urgency on administrative procedure is acknowl-
edged in various fields. ´Another weakness of this rather ideological approach is that if it 
was implemented, every requester could just claim urgency and true matters of urgency 
would be inseparable from fake ones.473 One way to deal with that could be to punish 
requesters for grossly wrongful claimed urgency, possibly through the imposition of 
punitive fees.  
Another reason why immediate access should require a proper proof of urgency is 
the final character of disclosure. Once granted, access to information cannot be reversed. 
One could point out that the potential for irreparable damage done to the agency or a 
third party due to ‘hasty disclosure’ is high. Although valid in theory it also must be said 
that expedition of requests does not necessarily mean that less diligence must be used. It 
only means that urgent request must be processed before non-urgent. Since ‘interim 
disclosure’ is not thinkable, one must admit that generally exceptional circumstances 
should be shown before urgent access is granted.  
Again, the suggested ways to deal with urgent matters cannot be read into PAIA’s 
procedure via interpretation. A workable proceeding for urgent matters simply is miss-
ing. The bottom line is, that ss 11 (1) (a) and 50 (1) (b) limit the right of access to infor-
mation without any apparent justification. 
ee) Appeal Process 
PAIA has been criticised for its appeal process being ‘unfair and unaffordable’ due to its 
procedural and financial barriers.  
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The first level of appeal is an internal review as is the case in most countries with 
FOI-legislation.474 This system of appeal theoretically can lead to an inexpensive and 
quick review as well as having the capacity to disburden the courts; but experience has 
shown that in most cases refusals are upheld in the internal process and delays are more 
likely than enhancement.475 Generally the internal processes’ flaws can be corrected on 
the second level, at court stage. The problem is that bringing a case before court is 
costly and results in significant delays. This is likely to largely prevent citizens from in-
voking their right, especially in developing countries. Furthermore, courts are often def-
erential to state agencies, especially in matters of national security.476 As the internal 
appeal process only applies to certain public bodies,477 all requests to other public bodies 
as well as all requests to private bodies are reviewed directly by the courts. 
It has also been proposed to establish special institutions to implement and enforce 
the right of access to information.478 Nevertheless, it is questionable if the establishment 
of yet another institution (for instance, an ‘Information Ombudsman’ or ‘Information 
Commissioner’) might not simply extend the procedure - and therefore the response 
time (say: delay).479 Furthermore, it will consume additional staff and financial resources 
that are simply not available. Instead it might be more viable to further pre-litigational 
conflict resolution through early disclosure to alleviate the courts’ burden and 
strengthen the appeal process. 
The appeal process at present shows flaws but nevertheless does not raise concerns 
regarding PAIA’s constitutionality. 
3. Implications of PAIA’s Unconstitutionality 
It has been pointed out that s 12 (a) of PAIA does not pass the constitutional test of 
s 36.480 To this extent PAIA does not give effect to the right of access to information. 
Thus, there is room for an application of s 32 (1) as an independent right,481 which can sustain 
a cause of action. Section 32 (1) covers those aspects of the constitutional right of access 
                                                 
474  Balisar (note 9) at 6. 
475  Balisar (note 9) at 6. 
476  Balisar (note 9) at 6. 
477  Section 74 (1) PAIA read together with section 1 PAIA, definition of ‘public body’, (a). 
478  McKinley (note 12) at 30. 
479  McKinley (note 12) at 30 f. 
480  See C.V.2.a)bb). 
481  Davis (note 31) at 26-11. 
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to information not provided for by the PAIA.482 Although the Constitutional Court 
stated that legislative regulation would be preferable, it also regarded s 32 (1) as directly 
enforceable.483 Some object to this submission due to the reason that the ‘constitutional 
right is mediated by provisions of the common law or legislation.’484 This argument, 
which is mainly based on s 8 (3), seems sweeping as s 32 (2) expressively demands to 
‘give effect’ to the right of access to information. Therefore it must be possible to rely 
directly on s 32 (1) if provisions of PAIA are found unconstitutional.485 The constitu-
tionality of PAIA can be challenged via the direct appeal procedure,  s 167 (6) (b) of the 
Constitution.486
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Transparency is a central constitutional value in the South African legal system. It is 
deeply entrenched in the Constitution. The right of access to information forms the 
central column to that constitutional building of transparency. PAIA has wide applica-
tion, is drafted very progressively and carries high potential for bolstering participatory 
democracy although its procedures are complex. Instead of condemning the PAIA for 
being a ‘watered-down, apologetic and limping version of what was proposed before’,487 
it seems more appropriate see it as ‘a classic example of just how far South Africans 
must still travel to turn the corner from affirmation (of a human right) to realisation.’488  
I. Interpreting PAIA in Consistency with the Constitution 
While some provisions appear unfortunate regarding the principle of maximum disclo-
sure, they can still be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the constitution: 
• Section 50 (1) (a), the qualification for requesting privately held information, 
must not be interpreted too narrowly. PAIA can be used for the protection 
and exercise of any right as long as the requester can reasonably think or 
hope the record is of help in this regard.489 
• The PAIA’s numerous grounds of refusal (ss 33 ff and 63 ff) must be inter-
preted narrowly to leave the act’s purpose intact. This is particularly impor-
tant for institutional exceptions as they remove whole areas from public scru-
tiny.490 
• The PAIA’s enforcement lacks momentum. The HRC is not capable of any en-
forcement unless properly funded and staffed. Enforcement by the High 
Courts encounters the notorious problem of overburdened court dockets.491 
• The PAIA’s protection of international relationships (s 41 (1) (a) (iii)), its integrated 
necessity of harm clauses and its public interest override (ss 46 and 70) are regretta-
ble considering the general principle of maximum disclosure but still consti-
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489  See C.II.2.b). 
490  See C.V.2.a)bb). 
491  See C.IV. 
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tutionally justified considering the nature of the right of access to informa-
tion and the nature of those limitations.492 
• PAIA must be interpreted disclosure friendly (s 2) not only by courts but also by 
agencies that act in their adjudicational function.493 
• Despite section 7 and the fear of ‘fishing expeditions’, PAIA can be used 
for pre-litigational discovery. The act does not infringe on rule 35 of the High 
Court as long as it is used as a subsidiary means. Moreover, it is desirable to 
achieve pre-litigational conflict resolution. ‘Fishing expeditions’ can be 
avoided using PAIA’s provisions: Regarding privately held information the 
requester has to prove a right-information-relation, s 50 (1) (a). Regarding 
publicly held information this is not possible as requesters are not obliged to 
show any ‘need to know’. Nevertheless, obvious ‘fishing expedition’-
requests can be turned down as vexatious or frivolous using s 45.494 
II. Unconstitutional Provisions of PAIA 
• The categorical exception of Cabinet’s records, s 12 (a), cannot be interpreted in accor-
dance with the Constitution. Neither can it be justified as the limitation is not 
necessary in terms of s 36: the same purpose can be achieved using PAIA’s nar-
rower exceptions, especially s 44, on a case by case basis. In this regard, the con-
stitutional right of access to information is directly applicable. 
• PAIA is incompatible with urgent matters. Requesters have no chance of disclosure in 
time because ss 11 (1) (a) and 50 (1) (b) force them to comply with a procedure 
that is so time-consuming that it turns into an instrument against ‘effective ac-
cess to information’ in urgent matters. Requesters of urgently needed informa-
tion should be allowed to comply with all but the most essential procedural re-
quirements after disclosure. Urgent matters must be given priority by requested 
bodies. Misuse by requesters can be prevented by the obligation to show and 
prove urgency and the right of the agency to impose surcharges. To balance the 
right to timely disclosure of all requesters, they must show and prove urgency to 
be entitled to preferential treatment of their request. This requirement does not 
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contravene the dogma that no ‘need to know’ must be shown because it is not a 
prerequisite to disclosure itself, but merely applies to the grant of priority.495 
PAIA includes no explicit procedure of urgency or means of any kind to expe-
dite access. Such a procedure cannot be read into PAIA’s provisions without 
transgressing the limitation set out by its wording. It appears as if the integration 
of an urgency procedure into the act simply has been forgotten. Pursuant to the 
PAIA, requesters are under no circumstances entitled to priority over others. 
The only imaginable purpose of the lack of a urgency procedure and the re-
questers’ obligation to comply with all procedural requirements might be equal-
ity and fairness: the right of all requesters to disclosure in time must be balanced. 
However, if one lets this purpose lead to the conclusion that urgent access is not 
recognised at all, ss 11 (1) (a) and 50 (1) (b) can only be considered grossly 
disproportionate regarding matters of urgency in terms of the limitation clause.  
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